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PROVOKING CHANGE: COMPARATIVE 
INSIGHTS ON FEMINIST HOMICIDE 
LAW REFORM 
CAROLYN B. RAMSEY* 
 
The provocation defense, which mitigates murder to manslaughter for 
killings perpetrated in the heat of passion, is one of the most controversial 
doctrines in the criminal law because of its perceived gender bias; yet most 
American scholars and lawmakers have not recommended that it be 
abolished.  This Article analyzes trendsetting feminist homicide law 
reforms, including the abolition of the provocation defense in three 
Australian jurisdictions, places these reforms in historical context, and 
assesses their applicability to the United States.  It ultimately advocates 
reintroducing the concept of justified emotion, grounded in modern equality 
principles and social values, as a requirement for voluntary manslaughter 
mitigation. 
Two insights guide this Article’s critique of partial excuses for murder.  
First, the revised legal history of intimate-partner homicide presented here 
demonstrates that the modern version of the provocation defense protects a 
broader class of angry, jealous, predominantly male defendants than the 
traditional doctrine of the nineteenth century did.  Heat-of-passion claims 
have become the new “abuse excuse” for men.  Second, battered woman 
syndrome evidence, which is now commonly admitted when abused women 
stand trial for murder, resonates uncomfortably with insanity claims.  
Reliance on such evidence ignores the fact that “rational moral actor” 
theories were also raised successfully in the past to defend domestic 
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violence victims who killed their partners.  Based on these insights, I argue 
that the most desirable aspects of the Australian reforms emphasize moral 
judgment about the defendant’s reasons for killing and disfavor concessions 
to irrationality. 
Inspired by Australian efforts, legislatures in the U.S. should 
implement comprehensive reform of homicide law and sentencing.  Yet, 
even if American states retain rigid sentencing structures, this Article 
advocates the repeal of the extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
defense and a reconceptualization of the provocation doctrine, guided by 
substantive equality principles, to require that the defendant’s valuation 
was justified.  Provocation mitigation should be curtailed by categorical 
exclusions for killings arising from beliefs and passions, including lethal 
rage at infidelity or the termination of an intimate relationship, that do not 
comport with evolving social norms.  Furthermore, although many battered 
women charged with murdering a violent spouse can successfully claim 
provocation under the excuse-based modern doctrine, reformist legislatures 
ought to provide a new intermediate outcome that fits better with the 
circumstances of such women’s cases.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Compared to rape doctrine, American homicide law has changed little 
in response to feminist concerns about the gender bias of the criminal law, 
aside from the controversial introduction of battered woman syndrome 
(BWS) evidence in murder trials.  Among nations whose law derives from 
the English model, the United States led the pack in allowing expert 
testimony on BWS.  Yet three states in Australia—a country that embraced 
BWS defense strategies comparatively late1—have taken the boldest strides 
toward a feminist transformation of homicide law.  Victoria, Tasmania, and 
Western Australia recently made a move that most American scholars and 
lawmakers have been reluctant to advocate: they abolished the provocation 
doctrine as a partial defense to murder.  Tasmania took this step in 2003 
without making other changes to the law of homicide or the admissibility of 
 
1 See PATRICIA WEISER EASTEAL, KILLING THE BELOVED: HOMICIDE BETWEEN ADULT 
SEXUAL INTIMATES 141-43 (1993) [hereinafter KILLING THE BELOVED]; Julie Stubbs & Julia 
Tolmie, Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment of the Australian Use of 
Expert Evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 709, 720 (1999) 
[hereinafter Falling Short] (stating that Australian courts have only accepted BWS evidence 
since 1991); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the 
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1991) (noting that, in the United States, forensic 
psychologist Lenore Walker “had introduced expert testimony on battered woman syndrome 
in sixty-five cases in which battered women had killed or hurt their abusers” by 1986).  For 
more discussion of the BWS theory, including a brief definition, see infra notes 128-32, 210, 
233-37, 326-27 and accompanying text. 
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evidence,2 whereas Victoria conducted a detailed study of homicide 
defenses and then enacted comprehensive reforms in 2005.3  Western 
Australia followed suit in 2008, abolishing provocation manslaughter and 
establishing a new partial defense for unreasonable self-protective killings 
similar to that adopted in Victoria.4  The changes in all three Australian 
states embodied a substantive equality position designed to remediate 
gender imbalances in the impact of the criminal law.  But especially in 
Victoria, reformers cited an additional theoretical basis—a moral objection 
to the modern provocation doctrine’s failure to distinguish legitimate 
emotions and beliefs from wrongful ones.5  The reformers thus reasserted 
the relevance of justification, but they were inconsistent about curtailing 
psychological excuses that reduce culpability in the guilt phase. 
This Article applauds the three Australian jurisdictions for striving to 
achieve substantive gender equality in homicide law.  However, to some 
extent, their approaches embody a pragmatic view of feminist reform that 
can be characterized as doing whatever works for women in the short term 
and faulted for failing to articulate a coherent normative theory of criminal 
responsibility.  This Article contends that the criminal law should express 
consistent moral judgments about the reasons the perpetrator committed 
homicide, not allow male defendants to excuse their equality-denying 
violence by claiming to have lost self-control, nor make reliance on 
psychological theories the primary method of defending women.  Inspired 
by the best aspects of the Australian reforms, American states should move 
away from partial excuses6 for murder that enforce pernicious gender-based 
 
2 Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003, (Tas. 
Acts No. 15/2003). 
3 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).  For the comprehensive 
recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission, see VICT. LAW REFORM 
COMM’N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter VLRC, DEFENCES TO 
HOMICIDE], available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/ 
Law+Reform/Home/Completed+Projects/Defences+to+Homicide/; see also infra notes 179-
237 and accompanying text (discussing the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s proposals). 
4 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 12 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No. 
29/2008).  In November 2009, the United Kingdom abolished the provocation doctrine in 
favor of a revamped partial defense for “loss of control” that requires either fear of serious 
violence or a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 
25, Part 2, Ch. 1, §§ 54-56.  For a brief discussion of the British reforms, which the British 
Parliament enacted too late to receive comprehensive analysis in this Article, see infra notes 
92, 308-12 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 180-82, 187-91, 194-200 and accompanying text. 
6 Excuse defenses embody the view that, although the defendant perpetrated a wrongful 
act, he should not be blamed or punished because a mental defect or other failing makes him 
less culpable.  Insanity exemplifies a classic excuse defense that leads to acquittal.  The 
modern provocation doctrine, which mitigates murder to manslaughter, is often considered 
to be a partial excuse.  See infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.  On the other hand, an 
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stereotypes and that fail to hold men or women to a high standard of 
responsibility.  In place of the current excuse-based regime of mitigation, 
legislatures ought to reintroduce the concept of justified emotion, grounded 
not only in contemporary social norms but also in equality principles.  This 
Article uses history, as well as legal analysis, to assess the Australian 
homicide law reforms with a focus on those in Victoria.  It also advocates 
changes in the United States, including the abolition of the extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance (EMED) defense7 and the restriction and 
reconceptualization of the provocation doctrine, which mitigates murder to 
manslaughter when the defendant claims he acted in the heat of passion. 
Reformers in Victoria posited a substantive gender equality rationale 
for abolishing the provocation defense based on the predominance of men 
among perpetrators of intimate-partner homicide and the fact that men and 
women kill in very different contexts.8  Substantive equality theories ask 
whether facially neutral rules have unequal effects.9  Thus, while defendants 
of both sexes can claim provocation, the defense is biased if it 
disproportionately benefits men, entrenches sexist stereotypes, or fails to 
recognize women’s experiences.  Although female defendants can 
 
actor who commits otherwise criminal conduct that is not wrongful, or that is less wrongful, 
because of the circumstances she faced, including the victim’s aggressive behavior, may 
receive exculpation or mitigation on a theory of justification.  Other legal scholars have 
criticized and modified this framework.  I owe an intellectual debt to Dan Kahan and Martha 
Nussbaum for their convincing discussion of “evaluative” and “mechanistic” approaches to 
emotion in the criminal law.  According to the evaluative conception, emotions “express 
cognitive appraisals [that] can be morally evaluated” for their appropriateness or 
inappropriateness.  Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273, 278 (1996).  In contrast, the mechanistic 
conception sees emotions as “things that sweep over us, or sweep us away, or invade us, 
often without our consent or control.”  Id. at 279.  Kahan and Nussbaum seek to dispense 
with the familiar dichotomy of “justification” and “excuse,” arguing that it is misleading and 
inadequate.  See id. at 318.  Nevertheless, this Article uses the “justification” and “excuse” 
shorthand for both simplicity’s sake and because the materials it quotes and interprets use 
these terms.  When this Article refers to “justification,” an evaluative approach to the 
defendant’s emotion is intended, whereas “excuse” is used to signify the law’s concession to 
circumstances in which the defendant’s will has supposedly been overborne. 
7 The Model Penal Code (MPC) version of this partial defense, which mitigates murder 
to manslaughter, encompasses “extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”  MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (emphasis added).  However, many states that adopted the 
MPC’s proposal simply provide mitigation for a defendant who “acts under extreme 
emotional disturbance.”  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 2009).  
For consistency’s sake, this Article uses the acronym “EMED,” except when quoted material 
abbreviates “extreme emotional disturbance” as “EED.” 
8 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 29-30; see also infra notes 185-87 and 
accompanying text (further discussing this rationale). 
9 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1994) 
(describing the theory of substantive gender equality). 
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successfully claim the provocation defense (indeed, they may be more 
successful raising this claim than men are),10 it does not fit the social 
situation in which most women kill.  Moreover, when men make use of the 
doctrine, it often provides mitigation for morally reprehensible acts and 
valuations. 
A revised history of homicide defenses supports the abolition or at 
least the curtailment of the expansive, modern provocation defense by 
exposing the substantively unequal and morally erroneous impact of 
supposedly progressive changes in the criminal law.  Two flawed historical 
narratives have impeded effective reforms.  The first is the predominantly 
conservative story of how time-honored defenses became distorted by 
pseudo-scientific “abuse excuses.”11  In the 1990s, James Q. Wilson and 
Alan Dershowitz—two American scholars of divergent political 
perspectives—agreed that a proliferation of “abuse excuses” threatened the 
legitimacy of the criminal law.12  The admissibility of BWS evidence to 
 
10 Despite the predominance of men as offenders in intimate-partner homicide cases, 
female defendants may actually be more successful in claiming provocation and other 
mitigating doctrines than male defendants, and they also may receive more lenient sentences 
than their male counterparts.  See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 28 (citing 
LAW REFORM COMM’N OF VIC., HOMICIDE REPORT NO. 40, ¶¶ 164, 165, 167-68 (1991)).  An 
early study cited by the Victorian Law Reform Commission presented data on ten women 
and sixty-five men who raised provocation as a defense: “Of the 10 women who raised 
provocation, six (60%) were convicted of manslaughter, and three (30%) were acquitted.  
None were convicted of murder.  In comparison, 13 (20%) of the 65 male accused who 
argued provocation were convicted of murder, 42 (65%) of manslaughter), and six (9%) 
were acquitted.”  Id. at 28 n.88.  But cf. id. at 28-29 (citing a more recent study, which found 
that very few women raised a provocation defense in Victoria and none were successful). 
According to a report on sentencing in Victoria, issued in 2008, women’s sentences for 
manslaughter were generally less severe than men’s, and men generally had to serve more of 
their sentences before becoming eligible for parole.  See FELICITY STEWART & ARIE 
FREIBERG, PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING 115-16 (SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL 2008) 
[hereinafter PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING] (on file with author); see also PATRICIA EASTEAL, 
LESS THAN EQUAL: WOMEN AND THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2001) [hereinafter 
LESS THAN EQUAL] (finding that in New South Wales and Victoria from 1988 to 1990, men 
were more likely to be convicted of murder or manslaughter than women and that 75% of the 
women received a non-custodial sentence or less than five years, compared to only 22% of 
the men).  However, these “lenient” sentences may not actually be more lax if we consider 
that many women who receive them killed out of fear of a violent aggressor. 
11 See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB 
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994) (criticizing this trend from a liberal 
perspective); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN 
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997) (presenting another rendition of this thesis by a conservative 
social scientist). 
12 Alan M. Dershowitz, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal 
System?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 775, 779 (2000) (book review) (noting parallels between his 
work and that of James Q. Wilson and accusing Wilson of impropriety for borrowing his 
ideas without attribution). 
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support battered women’s self-defense claims constituted a focal point of 
their attack.13  Although this critique contains at least a grain of truth, it errs 
in blaming women’s rights advocates for the ills of the modern criminal law 
and in embracing tradition for tradition’s sake. 
The second narrative—a feminist interpretation polar to the first—
recounts an oppression story in which female victims have either been 
killed by brutal men or convicted of murder in a gender-biased criminal 
justice system for using violence to defend themselves.14  This latter 
narrative draws on historical evidence of women’s subordinated status 
under the system of coverture15 and the sexist value system that persisted 
long after that legal regime was dismantled.  But it nevertheless overlooks 
the moral condemnation of violence against women in the past and the role 
this norm played in convicting male murder defendants and defending 
women who killed abusive partners.16  Indeed, feminists have only 
 
13 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 11, at 11-16; WILSON, supra note 11, at 56-58. 
14 See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 165-66 (1987); CAROLINE A. 
FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A 
MEASURE OF MAN 157-58, 197-98 (2000); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (1993); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE 
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 22-23 (2003); 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 113-14 (2000); 
LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY 
RESPONDS 236-37 (1989); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women 
Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121-23, 139-40 (1985); see also 
Susanne Davies, Captives of Their Bodies: Women, Law, and Punishment, 1880s-1980s, in 
SEX, POWER, AND JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW IN AUSTRALIA (Diane Kirkby 
ed., 1995) (stating that late nineteenth-century “Australian feminists condemned the law’s 
harsh punishment and inadequate protection of women” and that, even in the late twentieth 
century, women’s “acts of self-preservation tend to be misunderstood and condemned as 
ruthless and premeditated murder”); Robert M. Ireland, Frenzied and Fallen Females: 
Women and Sexual Dishonor in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 3 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 
95, 102 (1992) (describing the nineteenth-century feminist view that the unwritten law 
embodied a double standard that treated female avengers of sexual dishonor more harshly 
than male defendants accused of comparable crimes). 
15 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421, 430 (1765): 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated in that of her husband: under whose being protection, and cover, she performs 
everything; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; is 
said to be covertbaron, or under protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and 
her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. 
16 For evidence that female defendants who killed their partners were often acquitted, 
convicted of lesser charges than murder, or given lesser punishments, whereas intimate 
homicides perpetrated by men increasingly aroused condemnation in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-centuries, see infra Parts II.B and II.C.  See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, 
Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101 (2006) 
(making this argument with regard to the American states of New York and Colorado). 
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belatedly realized that the modern, excuse-based version of provocation 
actually protects a broader class of angry, jealous male defendants than the 
traditional doctrine17 and that BWS evidence resonates uncomfortably with 
insanity defenses for women.18 
The rationale reformers in Victoria offered for their overhaul of 
homicide defenses embodied a trenchant reinterpretation of the “abuse 
excuse” by suggesting that the provocation doctrine operates in similarly 
pernicious ways.19  Whereas Wilson wanted to retain the provocation 
defense,20 opponents of this doctrine in Australia convinced three state 
parliaments and, to a great extent, the general public that it was gender-
biased and primarily operated to excuse male anger, jealousy, and control 
 
17 The most influential study showing the effects of Model Penal Code reform on 
intimate homicide cases is Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and 
the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1331-34, 1352-67 (1997).  Since their 
adoption in the second half of the twentieth century, EMED doctrines have protected men 
who committed separation murders from the death penalty.  See Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital 
Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-
Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1521, 1528 (1996). 
18 For notable feminist critiques of BWS evidence by American scholars, see generally 
Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, 
Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211 (2002); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing 
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); see also Crocker, supra note 14, 137 (opining that BWS 
allows the legal system to treat women’s cases under a “separate and unequal standard of 
behavior”); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 38-43 (expressing concern that the learned 
helplessness component of Lenore Walker’s theory may lead to stereotyping).  For similar 
Australian perspectives, see LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 53-54; Jocelynne A. Scutt, 
Self-Defence and Women’s Lives: Reality and Unreality in Criminal Justice, in A JURY OF 
WHOSE PEERS?  THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF JURIES IN AUSTRALIA 100, 107-16, 119 (Katy 
Auty & Sandy Toussaint eds., 2004); Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 714, 
720-21, 736-38; Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia: A 
Challenge to Gender Bias in the Law?, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 192, 199-
211 (Julie Stubbs ed., 1994) [hereinafter Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia].  Celia 
Wells remarks that “it has . . . recently become de rigueur to note the essentializing and 
syndromizing effect of the admission of BWS.”  Celia Wells, Provocation: The Case for 
Abolition, in RETHINKING ENGLISH HOMICIDE LAW 85, 91 (Andrew Ashworth & Barry 
Mitchell eds., 2000). 
19 Cf. Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of 
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (1998) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON, 
MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM?).  What is 
remarkable and exciting about the Victorian reforms is that their proponents convinced such 
a broad base of supporters—including the parliaments, the press, and many ordinary 
Australians—of this view. 
20 WILSON, supra note 11, at 103.  To his credit, Dershowitz noted that the heat-of-
passion defense could be misused and argued that focusing on alleged provocations 
diminishes “the moral importance of the other factors that differentiate criminals from law-
abiding citizens who are also provoked but do not respond with lawlessness.”  DERSHOWITZ, 
supra note 11, at 139. 
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over women.21  Critics of BWS evidence fault it for pathologizing abused 
women and creating a special category for their conduct,22 but Victoria’s 
reformers recognized that the modern provocation doctrine plays a similar 
role in male defendants’ cases.  Urging the abolition of provocation, they 
called for a transformed regime of homicide defenses in which intimate 
killings would be understood in a social context and judged from a moral 
standpoint.23  Victoria’s successful campaign against provocation thus 
provides an opportunity to examine legislative changes that attempted, 
albeit inconsistently, to eschew excuses in favor of a moral evaluation of 
intimate-partner homicide. 
Unfortunately, Victoria’s reformers did not go far enough in curbing 
the influence of excuses on the criminal law.  Despite elevating the 
significance of relationship history and social context in terms divorced 
from psychology, they failed to jettison BWS evidence.  Moreover, 
although they wisely created a legal category of defensive homicide, which 
serves as a safety net for abuse survivors whom a jury does not want to 
acquit,24 they did not make sufficiently clear that this mitigating doctrine 
could be conceived as a partial justification based on a moral judgment 
about the reasons the defendant killed, rather than as a partial excuse for 
irrationality.  Finally, they imported duress, still tethered to BWS evidence, 
into their homicide statute,25 which further muddied the evaluative 
orientation of their reform package. 
The weaknesses of Victoria’s revolution in homicide law are as 
instructive as its strengths because they demonstrate the ways in which the 
feminist re-telling of criminal justice history has obscured the nuanced role 
of gender in homicide defenses.  Despite producing a thoughtful analysis, 
the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC or Commission)—the 
statutory body that spearheaded the overhaul—failed to free itself from the 
shortcomings of the feminist oppression story.  A more balanced reading of 
provocation’s evolution yields important insights about the operation of 
partial defenses.  Although excuse-based doctrines have for centuries 
 
21 See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005); Criminal Code 
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003, (Tas. Acts No. 15/2003); 
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 27, 29-30, 34.  For a discussion of public 
outrage over the successful use of the provocation doctrine to defend jealous men who killed 
their female intimate partners, see infra notes 163-65, 306 and accompanying text. 
22 See supra note 18 (collecting feminist critiques); see also WILSON, supra note 11, at 
56-58 (criticizing BWS evidence from a conservative angle). 
23 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxi, xxv. 
24 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6, 9AD. 
25 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, §§ 6, 9AG (Duress) & 9AH (3)(b) & (e) (Family 
Violence Evidence) (Vict. Acts); see VLRC, DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 121 
(advocating admissibility of BWS evidence in context of duress). 
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broadcast negative messages about women when used on behalf of abused 
female defendants charged with murder,26 reliance on excuses coexisted as 
early as the nineteenth century with an alternate defense strategy—the 
moral condemnation of violence against women.27  Concern about policing 
norms of respectable masculinity also helped secure murder convictions of 
violent men.28  Indeed, only in the last fifty years or so has a turn toward 
expansive, excuse-based mitigation unmoored from moral judgment 
significantly enlarged opportunities for men to escape severe punishment 
for separation killings.  To be sure, the historical condemnation of intimate-
partner homicide perpetrated by men and the corresponding sympathy for 
abused women charged with murder arose in part from paternalistic views 
of the male duty to protect the so-called weaker sex.29  Gender roles have 
changed dramatically in the last century, but this should not blind feminist 
reformers to the legal and rhetorical potential of moral judgment in the 
modern criminal law.  Seeing partial defenses through the lens of 
justification allows us to narrow their operation in a way that tracks a 
modern appraisal of the values underpinning a defendant’s lethal conduct. 
This Article proceeds in three major parts.  Part II suggests that, in 
criminal justice systems based on English precedents, the provocation 
doctrine of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offered a narrower 
safe harbor for violent men than does the modern version.  Despite its 
paternalism, the traditional approach to intimate-partner homicide generally 
condemned male brutality against women and took past abuse into account 
in female defendants’ cases.  Part II thus contends that, rather than 
supporting the retention of the expansive modern provocation doctrine, 
historical analysis bolsters the case for its abolition or at least its 
curtailment. 
Part III first provides background information about intimate-partner 
violence and related laws in modern Australia and expresses concern about 
feminist approaches that inadvertently expand legal defenses for angry, 
violent men while they cast women as psychologically damaged.  Part III 
then presents a critical analysis of the homicide reforms enacted in Victoria 
 
26 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 126-28 (discussing defenses based on women’s 
supposed irrationality and weakness in late nineteenth-century New York and Colorado); see 
also Coughlin, supra note 18, at 28-42 (comparing BWS to such nineteenth-century excuses 
as the marital coercion defense, which presumed a married woman who committed a crime 
did so under her husband’s coercion and which was grounded in psychological theories 
about women’s feeblemindedness). 
27 See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 43-50, 53-72 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 40, 73-74 and accompanying text. 
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in 2005 and briefly compares them to the abolition of the provocation 
defense in Tasmania and Western Australia. 
Part IV assesses the applicability of the recent Australian reforms to 
the United States.  Because American sentencing regimes are now in flux, 
some states may be willing to shift consideration of provocation claims to 
sentencing, as Victoria has done.  However, even if constraints on 
discretion in sentencing preclude a line-by-line graft of Victoria’s changes 
onto American codes,30 moral evaluation informed by equality principles 
should be adopted and the role of excuse doctrines curtailed.  Specifically, 
in the United States, legislatures ought to repeal EMED statutes based on 
the Model Penal Code.  If the provocation defense is retained in any form, 
its operation should be restricted by categorical exclusions for unjustifiable 
beliefs or emotions that led the defendant to kill.  American lawmakers can 
also learn from other aspects of Victoria’s reform package.  For example, 
widespread adoption by the states of an imperfect self-defense or “defensive 
homicide” provision would offer a desirable outcome between murder 
convictions and acquittals if, in contrast to Victoria’s approach, such a 
defense were expressly theorized as a partial justification stemming from 
the deceased’s violence, rather than as a concession to mental abnormality. 
 
II.  THE DOORWAY TO EFFECTIVE CHANGE: REVISING FLAWED LEGAL 
HISTORIES OF INTIMATE-PARTNER HOMICIDE 
A.  WHY LEGAL HISTORY MATTERS 
Scholars who defend the provocation doctrine often appeal to the 
weight of history in making their arguments.  Joshua Dressler contends that 
the partial defense has a long heritage that should not be discounted,31 and 
Wilson includes it among the time-honored traditional doctrines he wants to 
retain.32  Yet neither explains why its age should make it more defensible 
against charges of its unfairness to women, who for centuries had no hand 
in establishing or maintaining it.  Moreover, even historical arguments 
against placing the burden of proving heat of passion on defendants 
concede that the defense could be abolished completely without violating 
the United States Constitution.33 
 
30 See infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text. 
31 Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 963 (2002). 
32 WILSON, supra note 11, at 103. 
33 Patterson v. United States, 432 U.S. 197, 228 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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On the feminist side there is a tendency to reduce the history of murder 
defenses to a simple narrative of gender discrimination against female 
defendants that is weakened by empirical evidence that women in United 
States, Britain, and Australia have been acquitted of murder more often than 
their male counterparts.34  Thanks to Jeremy Horder’s influential legal 
history of the evolution of provocation from a partial justification for 
defense of honor to a partial excuse for loss of self-control,35 scholars and 
lawmakers generally realize that the doctrine changed over time.36  
Nevertheless, many detractors continue to see the justification- and excuse-
based versions of provocation as different forms of the same kind of 
patriarchy,37 although the latter, more expansive approach is actually much 
worse.38 
The legal treatment of murder cases in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries embodied two strands.  The first strand, which the 
scholarly literature has more often recognized than the second, was the 
excusing sympathy of courts, juries, and the public for supposedly 
damaged, hysterical females.39  If a woman’s irrationality was emphasized 
at trial, the jury would often acquit her on grounds of insanity.  However, a 
second and more remarkable strand existed, too: the moral condemnation of 
excessively violent men.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, this 
strand increasingly led to murder convictions for male defendants and more 
lenient treatment of wronged women charged with killing their abusers.  
Indeed, it allowed female defendants to contend that they had acted as 
 
34 For female defendants’ greater likelihood of being acquitted or convicted of a lesser 
crime than murder, see supra note 10 and infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
35 JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 2, 23-25, 72 (1992). 
36 For example, the VLRC cited Horder’s book when it provided historical background 
to its recommended reforms.  See VLRC, DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 21. 
37 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 18, at 88 (making such an assumption); “My Twin Sister 
Was Cut Off in Her Prime and She Will Probably Be out in Maybe Four . . . Five Years”: 
Murder Law Change, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Nov. 19, 2004, at 7 (reporting that Victoria 
Attorney General Rob Hulls cited the provocation defense’s origin as an honor-killing 
doctrine as proof that it was outdated, but also criticized it for being used as an excuse). 
38 See Nourse, supra note 17, at 1332; see also Caroline Forell, Homicide and the 
Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597, 609 (2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, 
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM) 
(commenting that the EMED doctrine “is an example of Reva Siegel’s ‘preservation through 
transformation,’ only worse” because the modern doctrine “does not just preserve the old 
forms of male bias, it expands them”). 
39 See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 993 (1995) (stating that, historically, “the most 
obvious explanation when an otherwise respectable woman responded violently to abuse was 
that she was insane”); see also Coughlin, supra note 18, at 28-42 (discussing the ways 
paternalistic sympathy for women’s supposed weakness allowed them to escape criminal 
responsibility). 
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responsible moral agents, and it permitted courts to bar men’s partial-
defense theories based on simmering sexual jealousy or other emotions 
outside the traditional provocation doctrine’s narrow bounds. 
The gendered values underpinning such appraisals have changed 
dramatically over time.  Extreme violence against women was considered 
unmanly in the late nineteenth century,40 whereas today we condemn it as 
the sexist denial of women’s equality and autonomy.  Nevertheless, 
historically, legal outcomes in domestic murder cases came closer than 
might be expected to what many modern feminists consider desirable.  I do 
not mean that men who kill out of a desire to control their female intimates 
should receive capital punishment or that a return to paternalistic solicitude 
for female weakness should be a feminist goal.  I simply mean that, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were fewer excuses for 
lethal violence against women than there are today. 
Twentieth-century changes generally did not improve legal approaches 
to intimate-partner homicide.  As the provocation doctrine was expanded to 
incorporate the individual traits and psychological impairments of the 
defendant, it became easier to defend jealous, controlling men based on 
theories of cumulative (and almost completely irrational) rage.  
Furthermore, increased reliance on psychological defense strategies, now 
bolstered by BWS evidence, stigmatized the female defendants it was 
intended to help without distinguishing appropriately between the various 
levels of innocence or guilt these women displayed. 
Part II has three modest aims.  First, it describes a nineteenth- and 
early twentieth- century trend toward convicting male defendants of murder 
for killing female intimates.  Second, it provides examples of cases from the 
same time period in which women successfully raised self-defense claims 
or were at least treated sympathetically due to their fear of physical 
victimization by the deceased.  Finally, Part II explains why the expansion 
of the provocation doctrine through more individualized consideration of 
the defendant’s circumstances, including his volitional impairment, and the 
repudiation of the cooling-time limit made it easier for jealous, angry men 
to obtain mitigation. 
B.  THE LIMITS OF MITIGATION FOR MEN 
There have always been gender asymmetries in the identity of 
murderers.  Across centuries and geographic boundaries, males outnumber 
 
40 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25. 
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females as both perpetrators and victims of homicide.41  In modern 
Australia, for example, men commit seven out of eight killings.42  Yet, in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, intolerance of many types of 
provocation claims became a mark of civility.43  The fate of many men who 
killed their wives or girlfriends was thus transformed from a choice 
between verdicts, including manslaughter or acquittal, to a choice between 
gradations of punishment for murder.44  Data that legal historians have 
culled in the United States, Britain, and Australia suggest this to be true 
across the English-speaking world,45 with the possible exception of the 
American South.46  Although male dominance over women permeated the 
legal history of countries founded in the Anglo tradition, such dominance 
was not uncomplicated.  It involved the policing of men by other men, 
including the punishment of those who transgressed by killing their 
spouses.  This punishment was understood to be a moral imperative, not 
simply a means of preserving male power.  Indeed, the denunciation of 
male brutality toward women seems to have become widespread due to a 
complex confluence of religious ideals, notions of respectability, and the 
 
41 See id. at 142 n.212 (collecting studies that show such a gender imbalance in homicide 
offending); see also PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 111 app. 2 (noting that, 
in Australia, homicides are overwhelmingly committed by men). 
42 Jenny Morgan, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond the Legal Categories 7 
(Victorian Law Reform Commission Occasional Paper, 2002). 
43 See MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 199-200, 239 (2004); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 141-56; see also 
Carolyn Strange, Masculinities, Intimate Femicide, and the Death Penalty in Australia, 
1890-1920, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 310, 334 (2003) (“[J]udges’ sentencing statements and 
newspaper editorials periodically clarified not only the illegality of lethal violence but the 
cultural illegitimacy of claiming jealousy and wounded masculine pride to justify 
femicide.”). 
44 See WIENER, supra note 43, at 222 (making this observation about British cases); 
Ramsey, supra note 16, at 156 (noting that the main difference between the fate of male 
intimate-murder defendants in New York and Colorado between 1880 and 1920 was that, in 
New York, they tended to be executed, rather than receive life sentences); Strange, supra 
note 43, at 318 (stating that complaints about their victims’ behavior “did not save men from 
conviction in the[] 64 capital cases [that she studied], but it did save capitally convicted 
husbands and lovers from the gallows”).  For further discussion of Australian cases, see infra 
notes 53-55, 65-67, 71-72 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 43-72 and accompanying text. 
46 For example, Texas courts “regularly excused homicides committed well outside the 
time frame of the adultery—that is to say, in flagrante delicto was no longer a factor for 
manslaughter.”  JOHN PETTEGREW, BRUTES IN SUITS: MALE SENSIBILITY IN AMERICA, 1890-
1920 299 (2007).  However, many of these cases involved men who killed the wife’s 
paramour, rather than being intimate-partner homicides.  See id. at 298-302 (discussing not 
only the heat-of-passion defense, but also a Texas “paramour statute” that treated a man’s 
killing of his wife’s lover as justifiable homicide and that courts liberally construed to justify 
killings based on circumstantial evidence, rather than actual witnessing of adultery). 
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indignation of liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor at 
the maltreatment of wives.47 
Martin Wiener has identified a trend in England “begun in the 
eighteenth century but only coming to fruition in the nineteenth” of seeing 
women as “more moral and more vulnerable than hitherto, while men were 
being described as being more dangerous, more than ever in need of 
external disciplines and, most of all, of self-discipline.”48  Thanks to the 
important position of women in the spiritual household, such trends may 
have started even earlier in colonial America, where Puritan influence led to 
the criminalization of domestic violence in the seventeenth century.49  By 
the mid-1800s, “[k]indly treatment of one’s wife . . . became an important 
qualification for full citizenship” in both countries.50 
Conditions for white women in Australia during the era in which New 
South Wales, Tasmania, and Western Australia served as penal colonies 
were worse than elsewhere in the English-speaking world.  Feminist scholar 
Anne Summers asserts that “[f]rom 1788 until the 1840s almost all women 
[in Australia] were categorized as whores,” and historians concur that the 
sexual commodification of female convicts constituted a prevalent aspect of 
social relations in the penal colonies.51  The “damned whore” taint also 
extended to some non-convict, immigrant women who arrived in Victoria, 
South Australia, and other parts of the continent.52  However, even in 
colonial Australia, men were prosecuted, convicted, and punished for 
 
47 See WIENER, supra note 43, at 151-62 (describing such influences in nineteenth-
century England); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25, 148-49 (discussing Victorian ideals of 
respectable manhood, including that of the Christian Achiever in the United States). 
48 WIENER, supra note 43, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
49 See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST 
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987).  But cf. MARY BETH 
NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF 
AMERICAN SOCIETY 78 (1996) (contending that spousal abuse prosecutions in colonial 
America “did not necessarily stem from the belief that a husband was wrong to use force 
against his wife, although that was what the Massachusetts statute stated.  Rather, the state 
and the community stepped in to mediate marital disputes when one or both parties seemed 
to have lost sight of their appropriate roles—when wives failed to submit to their husbands’ 
rule, when husbands ceased to govern wisely”). 
50 WIENER, supra note 43, at 161; see Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25 (discussing 
nineteenth-century ideals of manliness in the United States); cf. Strange, supra note 43, at 
311 (noting that judges’ sentencing statements, internal legal memoranda, and news articles 
“periodically expressed masculine disapproval of husbands’ misused marital authority” in 
New South Wales). 
51 ANNE SUMMERS, DAMNED WHORES AND GOD’S POLICE 267, 313-16 (1994); see also 
JUDITH A. ALLEN, SEX & SECRETS: CRIMES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN WOMEN SINCE 1880 4-5 
(1990); PAULA J. BYRNE, CRIMINAL LAW AND COLONIAL SUBJECT: NEW SOUTH WALES 1810-
1830 39, 50, 287 (1993). 
52 SUMMERS, supra note 51, at 323. 
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murdering their female intimates.  Indeed, out of a sample of twenty-five 
intimate homicide cases in New South Wales between 1824 and 1840, 
twenty-one of which involved male defendants, eleven men were convicted 
of murder, five were convicted of manslaughter, and another five were 
acquitted.53  The case of Matthew Miller, a constable tried for murdering his 
wife, provides an apt example.  Miller admitted that he strangled his wife 
out of jealousy because he suspected her of having a paramour.  Yet, 
despite citing her infidelity to explain his violence and pleading temporary 
insanity, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.54  In another 
case, William Bowles was executed for the fatal stabbing of his estranged 
spouse after the couple separated and the deceased told Bowles she wanted 
nothing further to do with him.55 
The first opportunity to show leniency toward male killers after arrest 
was the charging decision; yet men who killed their wives or girlfriends in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most often faced trial for 
murder.  Indeed, magistrates and prosecutors were reluctant to accept pleas 
to manslaughter in such cases.56  At trial, defendants faced doctrinal 
constraints when seeking mitigation based on the deceased’s allegedly 
provoking behavior.  Mere words, suspicion of adultery, wifely 
drunkenness, and neglect of household duties fell outside the traditional 
heat-of-passion categories for much of the nineteenth century,57 and judges 
 
53 See Appendix infra.  This data was compiled using DIVISION OF LAW, MACQUARIE 
UNIV., DECISIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 1788-1899, available at 
http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
54 Miller’s sentence was later commuted to transportation for life.  R. v. Miller (N.S.W.S. 
Ct. Cas. 1828), available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw/ 
Cases1827-28/html/r_v_miller__1828.htm. 
55 R. v. Bowles (N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 1835), available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/ 
scnsw/cases1835-36/html/r_v_bowles__1835.htm. 
56 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of Public Prosecutors in Historical 
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1365-66 (2002); see also WIENER, supra note 43, at 
188 (noting that magistrates became more likely to charge male defendants with murder in 
wife-killing cases, even when the man had used no weapon and been burdened with a 
drunkard spouse). 
57 See WIENER, supra note 43, at 178-79, 192 (describing the limits of the provocation 
doctrine in nineteenth-century England); Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 16, at 144-
52 (describing the narrow application of the provocation defense to male defendants’ cases 
in the western and northeastern United States during the late 1800s and early 1900s).  In 
Australia, insults and female insubordination may have been deemed more provoking than in 
the United States.  See G.D. WOODS, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES: 
THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1788-1900 347 (2002) (noting that a legislative act in 1883 expanded 
legally adequate provocation to include “grossly insulting language, or gestures, on the part 
of the deceased”).  But cf. WILLIAM HATTAM WILKINSON, FREDERICK BUSHBY WILKINSON & 
JOHN HUBERT PLUNKETT, THE AUSTRALIAN MAGISTRATE 255 (6th ed. 1894) (stating that, 
even after this statutory change, words or gestures were only recognized as provoking “in 
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strictly enforced the cooling-time limit as well.  Although the provocation 
doctrine had begun to be reinterpreted as a concession to human frailty,58 its 
limits derived from early-modern foundations, steeped in Aristotelian 
philosophy, that saw anger as “driven on by the desire of honour yet 
amenable to the rule of reason.”59  A hybrid doctrine that contained 
elements of both justification and excuse had emerged, but in the 1800s 
courts still held defendants to objective criteria rooted in the normative 
 
certain exceptional cases”) (citing 46 Vic., No. 17, § 370).  Some American courts also 
began to send verbal provocation cases to the jury in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) (stating that the sufficiency of the 
provocation generally should be a jury question).  However, others still held mere words 
insufficient as a matter of law.  See, e.g., People v. Turley, 50 Cal. 469, 470 (1862) 
(affirming the denial of a heat-of-passion instruction for a defendant who claimed to have 
been provoked by “words of reproach only”); see also CHARLES FAIRALL, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE OF CALIFORNIA INCLUDING THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA 276 (1906) 
(stating that “words of reproach, however grievous,” did not constitute sufficient provocation 
in California). 
When wifely provocation was at issue, juries, magistrates, and prosecutors seem to 
have felt the most sympathy for men whose spouses were intemperate.  My research 
suggests that, in both the United States and Australia, beating cases involving alcoholic 
victims were sometimes charged as manslaughter or reduced to this lesser offense in the guilt 
phase.  See, e.g., Coversheet and Deposition of Charles Mackin, surgeon, Queen v. Balmer, 
Case 12, Unit 245 (1862), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/O, Public Record Office 
Victoria (PROV) (on file with author) (showing that a habitual wife-abuser was only charged 
with and convicted of manslaughter for fatally beating his intemperate spouse); Untitled, 
ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 18, 1862, at 5 (on file with author) (reporting that a jury 
found Nathaniel Gardiner guilty of manslaughter, not murder, for killing his drunken wife 
when she spoke impudently to him); Wife Murder, ARGUS, Dec. 19, 1862, at 7 (on file with 
author) (further noting that the victim in the Gardiner case failed to cook her husband’s 
dinner); see also Ramsey, supra note 16, at 115-16 (discussing American manslaughter cases 
in which men fatally beat their drunken wives); cf. WIENER, supra note 43, at 192 (“Even if 
judges thought a beating death of a drunken wife were indeed murder, as was increasingly 
happening from the 1860s, juries were reluctant to agree.”). 
58 For example, by 1872, voluntary manslaughter was formally designated an 
“excusable” homicide in California.  THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA 54, ¶ 195 (1872); see 
also FAIRALL, supra note 57, at 276 (“It is only out of regard for human frailty that the law 
will extenuate murder to manslaughter.”).  This gradual evolution of the doctrine had begun 
in Australia by the end of the nineteenth century as well.  See WILKINSON, WILKINSON & 
PLUNKETT, supra note 57, at 148 (stating that provoked killings were not excusable, but that 
“the law pays regard to human frailty as not to put a hasty and a deliberate act on the same 
footing with regard to guilt”). 
59 HORDER, supra note 35, at 43.  Early modern “judges and commentators gave the 
element of excuse little by way of attention compared with the element of justification for 
action in anger.”  Id. at 85.  The defendant was not completely exonerated, however, because 
he had overreacted by killing the provoker.  The manslaughter conviction reflected a 
judgment that he had inflicted too much (disproportionate) retribution.  See id. at 52.  Horder 
notes that, in the nineteenth century, the original justifying categories remained largely 
intact, even as provocation began to be recast as loss of self-control.  See id. at 87. 
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assumption that “a reasonable man should exercise patience and 
forbearance” in the face of most kinds of abuse.60 
Even the most strongly gendered category of legally provoking victim 
behavior—sudden discovery of one’s wife in the act of adultery—was 
limited to that scenario.  Thus, despite the nineteenth-century obsession 
with female chastity, appellate courts affirmed murder convictions of men 
who killed their allegedly unfaithful wives after a time lapse or upon mere 
suspicion of adultery.61  The gradual shift toward seeing provocation as loss 
of self-control did not preclude courts in the past from concluding that “[a] 
man may deliberate, may premeditate and intend to kill . . . and to a large 
extent be controlled by passion at the time.”62  Such jealous husbands 
received first-degree murder convictions and sometimes even the death 
penalty.  Indeed, as Adrian Howe notes, “more than fifty years ago an 
English judge pronounced Othello guilty of murder.  In his eyes, there was 
nothing morally ambiguous about the slaughter of his wife, even if Iago had 
been telling the truth.”63 
Outside the iconic category of witnessed infidelity, the criminal law of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries refused to recognize a 
woman’s attempt to leave a man as legally adequate provocation.  Thus, in 
New York in 1896, a male defendant was convicted of capital murder for 
following his wife to a neighboring house and fatally shooting her when she 
separated from him and threatened to seek a divorce.64  Such convictions 
and punishments were common in late nineteenth-century New York and 
elsewhere in the United States.  The case of Sidney Solomon in New South 
Wales, Australia, provides another compelling example.  Solomon beat, 
choked, and punched his wife during her pregnancy.  After the couple 
 
60 FAIRALL, supra note 57, at 276 (explaining why “words of reproach” were not 
sufficient provocation in California). 
61 See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 48 P. 803, 803-04 (Cal. 1897) (“While ‘the sight of 
adultery committed by his wife’ may be . . . sufficient provocation to the husband which will 
justify that ‘heat of passion’ which is sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter, the 
knowledge of such fact must be based on something more tangible than mere surmise, and 
the knowledge must be so recent as to preclude the idea of cooling time or premeditation.”).  
A similar legal situation prevailed in Victorian England.  See WIENER, supra note 43, at 230 
(“Mere jealousy was not to be allowed as mitigation for taking life, and indeed was harshly 
condemned, especially so in the later years of the [nineteenth] century, when such cases 
almost always produced murder verdicts, and nearly all of these convicts were left to 
hang.”). 
62 People v. Jones, 2 N.E. 49, 52 (N.Y. 1885) (affirming a first-degree murder conviction 
of a defendant for fatally shooting his first wife). 
63 Adrian Howe, Provocation in Crisis—Law’s Passion at the Crossroads?  New 
Directions for Feminist Strategists, 21 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 53, 67-68 (2004). 
64 See People v. Youngs, 45 N.E. 460, 460-61 (N.Y. 1896) (noting that the facts of this 
case, in which the defendant claimed insanity, also did not show any provocation). 
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separated, Solomon came to his in-laws’ house, asking for twenty pounds.  
His father-in-law reminded him of a bond to keep the peace that he had 
posted and threw him off the property.  Solomon left, accompanied by his 
wife, but shot her to death in the street.  A jury convicted him of capital 
murder in 1930, although his sentence was subsequently commuted to penal 
servitude for life.65 
Courts and juries also treated the lethal rage of spurned suitors with 
severity; in fact, unmarried men had even less success claiming provocation 
than cuckolded or abandoned husbands did.66  As Carolyn Strange remarks 
about nineteenth-century Australia, “[i]n a period when informal 
heterosexual unions were still frowned upon in respectable circles, and 
when marriage was the key marker of adult status for men and women, 
unmarried men had greater difficulty than husbands did when it came to 
convincing respectable men that their femicidal violence was 
understandable.”67  Similarly, in the United States, both the formal law and 
social mores “condemned vengeful conduct by rejected suitors as ‘cowardly 
and unmanly.’”68 
The sentencing of men convicted of intimate murder varied.  In some 
jurisdictions, such as the American state of New York, the capital 
punishment of wife-killers constituted a remarkably high percentage of total 
executions.69  Wiener contends that, in England, “the later nineteenth 
century saw an increase in the level of punishment for wife-killing, 
particularly as compared with other killings” and notes that hangings of 
 
65 See Clerk of the Peace, Register of Cases Heard Before the Central Criminal Court, 
1923-1930, 19/13210, at 499 (Sidney Solomon, 1930), State Record Office New South 
Wales (“SRNSW”) (on file with author) (recording the conviction); Coversheet, Rex v. 
Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), SRNSW (on file with author) (same); Solomon Case: 
Sentence Commuted, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 28, 1930, at 13 (on file with author) 
(reporting that Solomon’s death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life).  For 
information on the couple’s separation and the victim’s pregnancy, see Deposition of 
Bernard Montgomery Garland, Coroner’s Inquest, at 14-15, Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the 
Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930, 
Central), SRNSW (on file with author).  For information about the events immediately 
preceding the victim’s death, see Deposition of Phyllis Maude Garland, Coroner’s Inquest at 
11, 13, Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court 
and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), SRNSW (on file with author).  Sidney 
Solomon’s case, as well as those of other Australian wife-killers, will be analyzed in greater 
detail in my forthcoming legal history of public responses to intimate-partner violence in 
Australia and the American West. 
66 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 151-52 (discussing the case of Martin Foy, who 
was executed in New York in 1893 for the stalking murder of his former paramour). 
67 Strange, supra note 43, at 324. 
68 Ramsey, supra note 16, at 152. 
69 See id. at 156, 158 tbl.4. 
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Englishmen who murdered their spouses were on the rise in the 1890s.70  In 
Australia, male prisoners were more likely to serve prison terms for killing 
their wives or girlfriends than to hang for it.  Yet such outcomes often 
resulted from the commutation of death sentences for murder, rather than 
from jury leniency or legal doctrines favoring men.71  Moreover, some male 
prisoners in Victoria and other Australian jurisdictions went to the gallows 
for killing female intimates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.72 
C.  THE DEFENSE OF WOMEN WHO KILLED MALE INTIMATES 
The legal treatment of intimate homicide in the past occurred in a 
system that precluded women’s full citizenship.  Females were presumed 
physically and emotionally weak, barred from the sphere of business and 
politics, and deemed in need of protection from more powerful, worldly 
men.73  The law of coverture rendered wives unequal, subordinate, and 
dependent throughout much of the nineteenth century.74 
 
70 WIENER, supra note 43, at 164; see id. at 210. 
71 See Strange, supra note 43, at 310-11, 315. 
72 For an example of a capital intimate-murder case that resulted in execution, see 
Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851-1889 (John McDonald, 1860), VPRS 
7583/P0001/1, PROV (on file with author) (recording McDonald’s execution); see also 
Untitled, ARGUS (Austl.), Sept. 4, 1860 at 4 (on file with author) (“The man McDonald lately 
convicted of the murder of his wife, under circumstances of peculiar atrocity, at Ironbark 
Gully, Bendigo, was executed yesterday morning . . . .”).  For an example of gubernatorial 
clemency toward a wife-killer from the same time period, see Register of Decisions on 
Capital Sentences, 1851-1889, VPRS 7583/P0001/1 (William Smith, 1860), PROV (on file 
with author) (noting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life with hard labor 
and three years in irons); see also Deposition of Dr. William Tarrant Merson, Coroner’s 
Inquest, Queen v. Smith, Case 3-339-31, Unit 136 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 
30/P/0, PROV (on file with author) (stating that deceased had a broken neck and that she had 
also been whipped and kicked with nailed boots).  The case of John McDonald, as well as 
those of other Australian wife-killers, will be analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming 
legal history of public responses to intimate-partner violence in Australia and the American 
West.  The relatively comprehensive empirical data available for New South Wales indicates 
that, despite the mandatory death penalty for murder, less than 10% of sixty-four intimate 
femicide and attempted femicide convictions between 1890 and 1920 resulted in executions.  
See Strange, supra note 43, at 315.  Thus, gubernatorial clemency based on provocation 
claims was common in Australian wife-murder cases, but any domestic discount that existed 
“did not amount to carte blanche for men to kill women.”  Id. at 311. 
73 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 126. 
74 See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 121 (2000); see also 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 430-32 (explaining the concept of coverture); Hilary Golder 
and Diane Kirkby, Marriage and Divorce Before the Family Law Act 1975, in SEX, POWER, 
AND JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 156 (discussing the implications of coverture in nineteenth-
century Australia); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New 
York (1854), in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861 595-99, 602-05 (Elizabeth 
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Such inequality did not mean that women were disproportionately 
convicted of murder, however.  Rather, by the early nineteenth century, a 
diminution of “powerful fears and horror earlier evoked by female killers, 
in contrast to the hardening attitudes toward violent men” was evident in 
the criminal courts.75  Data from such American states as New York, 
Colorado, and Illinois suggest that juries acquitted women or convicted 
them of manslaughter much more often than murder.76  In England, 
decisions not to prosecute defensive husband-killings or to commute death 
sentences in such cases increased.  Wife-killers in the last third of the 
nineteenth century were “slightly more likely to be found guilty” and 
“much more likely to be hanged” than husband-killers.77  Although the 
available empirical evidence indicates higher conviction rates for women 
charged with killing their male intimates in Australia than in England or the 
United States, just under half of all female murder defendants were 
acquitted in a Sydney suburb in the late nineteenth century.78  When 
Australian women turned to deadly weapons instead of poison, which was 
associated with premeditated killings, they enjoyed greater success in 
raising provocation defenses.79 
Exculpation or mitigation for accused women took two forms, which 
were sometimes intertwined: the justification of a wronged woman’s lethal 
act or the sympathetic acceptance of an insanity theory.80  Insanity 
determinations even led to the dismissal of the case before trial if the 
woman was deemed completely delusional.81  In contrast, wronged 
 
Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Grange eds., reprint ed. 1985) 
(describing women’s legal, political, and social disabilities in the mid-nineteenth-century 
United States). 
75 WIENER, supra note 43, at 123; see Ramsey, supra note 16, at 105, 139-44, 176-78 
(observing this contrast later in the nineteenth century). 
76 Jeffrey S. Adler, “I Loved Joe But I Had to Kill Him”: Homicide by Women in Turn-
of-the-Century Chicago, 92. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 883-84 (2002) (showing that 
“every white woman who killed her husband [in Chicago] between August, 1905 and 
October, 1918 was exonerated or acquitted, totaling thirty-five consecutive cases”); Ramsey, 
supra note 16, at 121-22 tbls.1-2 (presenting data from New York County, New York, and 
Denver County, Colorado). 
77 WIENER, supra note 43, at 165-66; see id. at 132-33, 149 (discussing non-prosecution 
and clemency). 
78 ALLEN, supra note 51, at 41. 
79 See id. at 111. 
80 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 128. 
81 This occurred, for example, in the case of Sarah Elizabeth McDonald, who was 
charged with poisoning her husband in New South Wales in 1930.  After being certified 
insane, McDonald was confined to the Parramatta Mental Hospital.  See NEW SOUTH WALES 
POLICE GAZETTE, NRS 10958, Reel 3606, at 325, SRNSW (on file with author); Insane 
Woman Poisons Husband, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, March 8, 1930, at 21 (on file with 
author). 
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women’s cases typically involved a homicide that defense lawyers 
characterized as either the jilted woman’s honor-killing of her unfaithful 
seducer or an act of self-defense against a violent spouse.82  Homicide 
scenarios considered “justifiable” in the late 1800s and early 1900s were 
thus remarkable for the degree of moral condemnation directed at the 
deceased man who drove the female defendant to kill. 
In confrontational self-defense cases involving close temporal 
proximity between the deceased’s attack and the defendant’s use of lethal 
force, the law allowed evidence of past domestic violence to be admitted.  
Female defendants could thus obtain acquittal on the basis of a self-defense 
instruction.83  For example, in New South Wales in 1910, a jury found 
Caroline Buckman not guilty of murder for fatally shooting her abusive 
husband when he ran over her on his horse and attacked her with a stick.84 
Non-confrontational cases posed greater difficulties for the defense, as 
they do today.  Courts often told the jury not to consider past-abuse 
evidence if there had been no imminent attack.  In Victoria in 1884, for 
instance, Mary Silk was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering her 
brutal, drunken husband, who had allegedly threatened her with a gun and 
committed incest with their daughter.  The jury wanted to extend mercy “on 
account of her husband’s flagrant misconduct, but so much time intervened 
after this misconduct and the pursuit of his wife with a gun before any 
 
82 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 118-21, 130 (analyzing New York cases involving 
female defendants who were acquitted of murder after killing their seducers); see id. at 125, 
133-36 (discussing acquittals and lesser-included offense verdicts for women who killed 
physically abusive men).  But cf. Marianne Constable, Chicago Husband-Killing and the 
“New Unwritten Law”, 124 TRIQUARTERLY 85, 88 (2006) (stating that women who killed 
husbands out of fear were often acquitted, whereas cases involving jealousy or betrayal 
“tended to be cases that led to conviction”). 
83 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 129-30 (discussing People v. Taylor, 69 N.E. 534 (N.Y. 
1904), in which an appellate court found the exclusion of past-abuse evidence to be 
prejudicial error); see also WIENER, supra note 43, at 132 (discussing the self-defense 
acquittal of Harriet Webster in England in 1858); Constable, supra note 82, at 91 (stating 
that jury instructions and verdicts in Chicago cases as early as 1905 show that a female 
defendant might be exonerated if she “honestly believed she was in great danger of losing 
her life”). 
84 See Supreme Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Register of Criminal Indictments (1907-
1919), 9/2635, Reel 1861 at 88 (on file with author) (recording acquittal); Coversheet, Rex v. 
Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (on file with author) (same).  For the defendant’s 
account of the events immediately preceding the shooting, see Deposition of Caroline 
Augusta Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 55, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, 
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), 
SRNSW (on file with author).  Caroline Buckman’s case and those of other Australian 
husband-killers will be analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming legal history of public 
responses to intimate-partner violence in Australia and the American West. 
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violence was inflicted by the prisoner as to preclude either being considered 
as any palliation at law.”85  Although the imminence requirement prevented 
an acquittal, the governor commuted Silk’s death sentence to twenty years 
in prison with hard labor.86 
American and English juries often exonerated female defendants or 
found them guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter when the evidence 
indicated they had suffered past abuse at the deceased’s hands.  These 
verdicts sometimes nullified instructions stating that brutal conduct did not 
justify or excuse murder.87  Yet judges also occasionally acknowledged the 
relevance of past-abuse evidence to justifiable homicide in non-
confrontational situations, indicating a willingness to expand the time frame 
to consider events that occurred prior to the lethal incident.88 
Defense attorneys sometimes blended the images of the wronged 
woman and the hysterical female, even when the defendant’s emotions and 
beliefs had some moral legitimacy.  Yet cases of women charged with 
killing their male partners in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
nevertheless demonstrated the presence of two avenues to mitigation or 
acquittal.  The depiction of female defendants as frail bundles of nerves 
might arouse sympathy, but juries were equally capable of taking the past 
history of the relationship into account and recognizing both the battered 
spouse and the violent man she killed as rational actors whose conduct 
should be judged by prevailing moral standards. 
D.  THE EXPANSION OF THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE 
In countries whose law derived from the English model, the 
provocation doctrine eventually underwent dramatic expansion.  Changes in 
 
85 Report on the Case of Mary Ann Silk by Chief Justice William Stawell, March 19, 
1885, Queen v. Silk, Unit 11 (1884), Victoria Capital Case Files, VPRS 264/P/0, PROV (on 
file with author).  Mary Silk’s case and those of other Australian husband-killers will be 
analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming legal history of public responses to intimate-
partner violence in Australia and the American West. 
86 See Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851-1889 (Mary Ann Silk, 1884), 
VPRS 7583/P0001/1, PROV (on file with author). 
87 See, e.g., WIENER, supra note 43, at 131-32 (describing judicial and jury sympathy for 
battered women who killed their abusers in Victorian England); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 
125, 135-36 (discussing the cases of Beatrice Gordon and Carmella Fiorini, whose stories of 
abuse aroused jury sympathy in early twentieth-century Colorado); cf. Constable, supra note 
81, at 89 (speculating that the “new unwritten law” in Chicago may have been “an early 
version of something like a battered woman’s syndrome defense” in cases involving killings 
that “occurred during the course of one of many struggles”). 
88 For example, the New York Court of Appeals found prejudicial error in a decision to 
exclude evidence of the deceased’s past rape of the defendant, which would have 
contextualized the defendant’s homicidal response to his refusal to marry her.  See Ramsey, 
supra note 16, at 130 (discussing People v. Barbieri, 43 N.E. 635 (N.Y. 1896)). 
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the 1800s involved a greater focus on loss of self-control, as opposed to 
defense of honor; yet the retention of the limited, common law categories of 
adequate provocation preserved legal boundaries reflecting moral 
judgments about defendants’ emotions and beliefs.  By contrast, the 
twentieth century brought statutory and judge-made alterations that 
individualized the doctrine and made it much more subjective. 
The new excuse-based approach seemed to point “inexorably towards 
the conclusion that whatever the provocation, be it serious or trivial, if it is 
found as a matter of empirical fact that defendants genuinely lost self-
control before killing, the killing should be reduced to manslaughter.”89  
Not all jurisdictions went so far, but many journeyed a good ways down 
this road.  The modern standard in Australia will be described below.90  In 
Britain and Canada, judicial decisions excused men’s violent rage and 
jealousy in ever widening scenarios.  Britain modestly extended the 
reasonable person test to include sex and age in the 1970s,91 but in the 2001 
case of Regina v. Smith, the House of Lords authorized the jury to consider 
any “characteristic of the accused, whether temporary or permanent” that 
reasonably affected his ability to exercise self-control.92  Canadian 
decisions abandoned the “mere words” exclusion and allowed juries to 
mitigate whenever the defendant’s traits or background “give the act or 
insult in question a special significance.”93 
In the United States, the adoption by a substantial minority of 
jurisdictions of an EMED defense, based on Model Penal Code proposals, 
completely severed voluntary manslaughter from provocation and 
justifiable emotion.  The Code directs the jury to decide whether the 
defendant killed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse,” but 
further requires that this reasonableness analysis be done “from the 
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be.”94  The Commentaries attempt to clarify that 
 
89 HORDER, supra note 35, at 95. 
90 See infra notes 101-19 and accompanying text. 
91 Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.). 
92 R. v. Smith (Morgan), [2001] 1 A.C. 146 (H.L.).  In recent years, however, the 
provocation defense has come under fire in Britain and, under the Coroners and Justice Act 
of 2009, it will be replaced with a new partial defense of “loss of control” for killings in 
response to fear or to a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.  Coroners and Justice 
Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, §§ 54-56; see also infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text 
(discussing Britain’s reforms). 
93 See Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the 
United States, Canada, and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 48 (2006) 
[hereinafter Forell, Gender Equality] (discussing R. v. Thibert [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.)). 
94 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). 
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“idiosyncratic moral values are not part of the actor’s situation.”95  But by 
instructing on EMED in cases in which a man killed his girlfriend’s lover 
for taunting him,96 strangled a prostitute due to unrelated stress in his life,97 
fatally shot a former partner for dancing with another man,98 or committed 
homicide for myriad other barely explicable reasons, American courts come 
close to affirming the defendant’s aberrant valuations. 
The Model Penal Code approach repudiates the traditional cooling-
time limit and indicates that the victim-as-provocateur does not need to 
have played a catalytic role.  Indeed, no triggering event is required.  A 
killer who brooded over his homicidal feelings, without even having a fully 
comprehensible desire for revenge, remains eligible for manslaughter 
mitigation.  Such evasiveness about moral judgment puts great weight on 
the opinion of psychiatrists whose testimony may distract from a 
commonsense understanding that the killing arose from the defendant’s 
depraved valuations.99  Unmoored from common law constraints, the 
EMED defense allows a sympathetic psychological expert to reinterpret the 
defendant’s history of increasingly brutal dominance over the victim as a 
logical progression from emotional trauma to uncontrollable violence.  Of 
course, the jury need not believe the expert, but allowing the broad defense 
in the first place, without providing any fixed standard to guide jury 
deliberation, erodes the criminal law’s legitimacy and creates the potential 
for inconsistent, arbitrary results. 
Expansive manslaughter mitigation thus partially excuses separation 
assaults and other homicides that the nineteenth-century provocation 
doctrine never contemplated.  As we shall see, a similar change occurred in 
Australia, and it coincided with the “medicalization” of self-defense law.100  
Indeed, rather than eschewing images of female irrationality that sometimes 
conjured jury sympathy in the 1800s, the defense of battered women who 
killed their abusers has, in recent decades, relied even more heavily on 
psychological theories.  Neither the subjectivization of the provocation 
doctrine nor the advent of the BWS strategy has benefitted women 
 
95 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3 cmt., at 62-63 (1980). 
96 People v. Harris, 740 N.E.2d 227, 229-31 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the jury should 
have been instructed on EMED at trial of defendant for killing victim who taunted him about 
his girlfriend’s past and likely future infidelity). 
97 State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 910-12 (Conn. 1999) (noting that an EMED 
instruction was properly given in this case). 
98 LEE, supra note 14, at 36-38. 
99 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 325. 
100 See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (describing the medicalization of self-
defense law, as well as such mitigating claims as diminished responsibility). 
2010] PROVOKING CHANGE 57 
collectively in the long run, even though the latter did achieve acquittals for 
some horrifically abused defendants. 
Abolishing or at least sharply circumscribing partial excuses for loss of 
self-control would help combat stereotypes of violent rage as a normal 
aspect of masculinity, while allowing the defense of women as rational 
actors whose resort to lethal force constituted a legitimate response to life-
threatening abuse.  Nineteenth-century moral judgment tracked nineteenth-
century values; in an age before women could vote, attitudes toward female 
victims and defendants were unsurprisingly paternalistic.  Yet, because 
excuses have in the end proved more illiberal than justifications, it may be 
time to embrace the latter, reinterpreted in light of modern equality norms. 
III.  INTIMATE-PARTNER HOMICIDE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE 
PROVOCATION DOCTRINE IN AUSTRALIA 
A.  HOMICIDE DEFENSES IN AUSTRALIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 
Prior to the twenty-first century campaign to abolish the provocation 
doctrine, partial defenses to murder in Australia evolved toward an excuse-
oriented focus on the overthrow of reason by emotion.101  The evolution of 
the provocation doctrine in Australia paralleled trends in the United States, 
Britain, and Canada.  Part III.A considers the state of the pre-reform law as 
a prelude to discussing the recent legislative changes in Tasmania, Victoria, 
and Western Australia. 
1.  Provoking Conduct and Loss of Self-Control 
The provocation doctrine in modern Australia operates as an excuse.102  
According to a VLRC publication describing the pre-abolition state of the 
law in Victoria, “[t]he focus of the defence of provocation has . . . become 
the accused’s loss of self-control, rather than justifiable retribution . . . .  
The defence is now generally seen to be a ‘concession to human frailty,’ 
rather than an appropriate response to a breach of honour.”103  The 
availability of manslaughter mitigation for the 2003 killing of Melbourne 
socialite Julie Ramage provides an example.  James Ramage received an 
eleven-year manslaughter sentence with an eight-year non-parole period for 
beating and strangling his estranged wife to death after she allegedly 
insulted his lack of sexual prowess, admitted to having a lover, and told him 
 
101 See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text. 
102 VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE ISSUES PAPER 43 (2002) 
[hereinafter VLRC, ISSUES PAPER]. 
103 Id. 
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their marriage was over.104  Mental health professionals testified that 
Ramage had become “extremely anxious, obsessed and emotionally 
fraught” when his wife left him,105 and the trial judge allowed the jury to 
find provocation based on mere words, despite lack of clarity in Australian 
law regarding whether mere words suffice.106 
Australia’s states and territories have applied the provocation doctrine 
in slightly different ways.107  However, for more than a decade, they have 
been guided by a series of Australian High Court decisions, culminating in 
Stingel v. Regina, in which all members of the Court agreed upon an 
“ordinary person” test that freed the partial defense from specified 
categories of provoking conduct.108  According to this two-part test, the jury 
can consider the characteristics of the accused in measuring the gravity of 
the provocation, but it is still instructed to decide whether an ordinary 
person would have reacted the way the accused did.109  Characteristics of 
the accused relevant to the first part of the test include “age, sex, race, 
ethnicity, physical features, personal attributes, personal relationships or 
past history.”110  “Personal attributes” may encompass “mental instability or 
weakness.”111  In Victoria, changes to the traditional requirements prior to 
the 2005 statutory reforms also involved the demise of the cooling-time 
limit and the recognition of cumulative effects producing a loss of self-
control.112 
Thus, Victoria’s common law doctrine was only slightly less 
subjective than the American EMED defense.  Compared to the traditional 
view of legally adequate provocation, it greatly expanded the class of 
defendants who could claim mitigation.  Modification of the objective 
standard in Australia arose, at least in part, from the well-meaning goal of 
making the criminal law more inclusive in a multi-cultural society.  The 
desire to judge immigrants and aboriginal people by standards reflecting 
 
104 See Bernadette McSherry, Men Behaving Badly: Current Issues in Provocation, 
Automatism, Mental Impairment and Criminal Responsibility, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & 
L. 15, 16-17 (2005); see also PHIL CLEARY, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: THE TRUE STORY 
OF JULIE RAMAGE’S DEATH 28-30 (2005). 
105 McSherry, supra note 104, at 17. 
106 See Bernadette McSherry, Afterword: Option for the Reform of Provocation, 
Automatism and Mental Impairment, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44, 45 (2005) 
(discussing whether mere words constitute adequate provocation under Australian law). 
107 Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 93, at 38. 
108 Stingel v. R. (1990) 171 C.L.R 312. 
109 Masciantonio v. R. (1995) 183 C.L.R 58; Stingel v. R. (1990) 171 C.L.R 312. 
110 Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 326; see VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 25. 
111 Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 326; see VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 25. 
112 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 24. 
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their own values played a significant role,113 as did the acknowledgement 
that battered women might kill after a prolonged period of abuse.114  
However, despite these good intentions, the expansion of the doctrine had 
negative consequences for substantive gender equality.  Prior to its abolition 
in Victoria, the partial defense resulted in manslaughter verdicts for so-
called sexual rage killers without any requirement that the defendant 
actually witness an adulterous act and accepted “that it is ‘provocative’ for 
women to leave their partners, at least when they ‘flaunt’ their new 
relationship.”115  Indeed, as the reformers persuasively argued, the 
provocation doctrine operated to excuse male anger and violence toward 
women even though, on its face, it applied equally to both sexes.116 
Although facially neutral, an excuse-based version of the provocation 
defense encourages a stereotype of men as hot-blooded, impulsive, and 
unable to control their violent urges.  This is especially troubling because an 
alternate construction of the facts often suggests a premeditated murder 
arising from the defendant’s outrage at his failure to dominate his intimate 
partner over a long period of time.117  The Ramage case, for example, 
involved evidence that the defendant engaged in many acts to cover up his 
crime.  In the hours following Julie Ramage’s death, James Ramage buried 
her body in a shallow grave in the countryside, washed his car, ordered 
some granite countertops, and told family members that he did not know 
where his wife had gone.118  These facts, combined with excluded evidence 
indicating that James had physically abused Julie in the past,119 suggest that 
James could have controlled himself and that the killing was planned 
retaliation for Julie’s act of leaving.  The social and moral message that 
voluntary manslaughter mitigation sends is thus inaccurate and promotes 
damaging stereotypes of masculinity. 
 
113 See Simon Bronitt, Visions of a Multicultural Criminal Law: An Australian 
Perspective, in MULTICULTURAL JURISPRUDENCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
MULTICULTURAL DEFENSE 121, 124-26 (A.D. Renteln & M. Forbes eds., 2009). 
114  VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 24. 
115 Morgan, supra note 42, at 39. 
116 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 27. 
117 G.R. Sullivan, Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 421, 427 (1993).  For a comparable analysis by an American legal scholar, see Donna 
K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter, Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 86-87 (1992). 
118 See McSherry, supra note 104, at 17. 
119 See id. at 21 n.10 (describing the evidentiary rulings); Provocation Ruling, GEELONG 
ADVERTISER (Austl.), Dec. 11, 2004, at 38 (reporting that Crown Prosecutor Julian Lecke 
said, “Ramage had a history of bullying his wife and had head-butted her and broken her 
nose on a previous occasion”). 
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2.  Self-Protection and Pathology 
While feminists in Australia and elsewhere lament the gender-biased 
nature of provocation, it nevertheless constitutes a common means of 
defending female murder defendants.  Restrictions on self-defense in 
Australia have often forced battered women who killed their partners to rely 
on diminished responsibility or provocation claims.120  Victoria has never 
allowed the partial defense of diminished responsibility, but four other 
Australian jurisdictions do.121  Where it is successful, it mitigates murder to 
manslaughter both for women who kill after a prolonged history of abuse 
and for men who contend they lost control when their female partner ended 
the relationship.122  Yet defense efforts to claim diminished responsibility 
using psychiatric testimony do not always succeed,123 and mitigation comes 
at the expense of depicting the defendant as mentally abnormal. 
Australian women accused of non-confrontational intimate homicides 
in the recent past had to rely on provocation or diminished responsibility 
claims.  Prior to the 1987 ruling in Zecevic v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions,124 exculpation on self-defense grounds in Victoria clearly 
required an imminent threat of death or bodily harm to the accused.  Zecevic 
purported to eliminate the imminence requirement for all self-defense 
 
120 See Stubbs & Tolmie, Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia, supra note 18, at 192; 
see also Morgan, supra note 42, at 41-43 (discussing the use of the provocation doctrine to 
defend battered women accused of murdering their partners); Violet Roberts: Justifiable 
Homicide?, 5 LEGAL SERV. BULL. 63, 63-64 (1980) (describing Australian murder cases 
from the 1970s in which battered women sought to defend against murder charges by 
pleading diminished responsibility). 
121 VLRC, ISSUES PAPER, supra note 102, at 83; see also VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, 
supra note 8, at 232-33 (noting that the diminished responsibility claim is available in the 
Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, New South Wales, and the Northern Territory). 
122 VLRC, ISSUES PAPER, supra note 102, at 83. 
123 See generally Violet Roberts: Justifiable Homicide?, supra note 120 (describing the 
murder conviction of Violet Roberts and her son, Bruce, for the fatal shooting of Violet’s 
violently abusive husband in 1975).  A jury found both mother and son guilty of murder, 
even though Violet, who had repeatedly attempted suicide, claimed diminished responsibility 
based on depressive illness.  Violet received a life sentence.  Bruce admitted to pulling the 
trigger while Eric slept, but he only got fourteen years.  See Debbie Kirkwood, Heather 
Osland: Still in Prison, 6 WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE 60, 62 (1999) (on file with author) 
(comparing the Roberts case to the similar facts of Osland v. R.).  After sentencing, a heated 
campaign for the Roberts’ release led to a twenty-thousand-signature petition, a half-page 
advertisement in the Sydney Morning Herald, and acts of the protest that included breaking 
into government ministers’ offices, spray-painting the walls of the cabinet room, and 
throwing cream buns at politicians.  Id.; see Violet and Bruce Roberts: Released, 5 LEGAL 
SERV. BULL. 312, 312 (1980) (on file with author) (describing civil disobedience in the 
campaign to secure the Roberts’ release).  Violet and Bruce Roberts were released from 
prison in October 1980 after serving about five years.  See jd. 
124 Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (Vict.) (1987) 162 C.L.R 645 (Austl.). 
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claims, not just those raised by abuse victims.125  Thereafter in Victoria, 
imminence counted as one factor, among others, relevant to whether the 
accused believed it was necessary to kill in self-defense.126  Yet, according 
to one scholar, 
[s]ome courts . . . continued to interpret the factors of self-defence in terms of what is 
reasonable for the average . . . middle class white male, rather than what a battered 
woman might reasonably do.  Accordingly, in most cases in which women have been 
acquitted to date, they killed immediately (as defined in seconds) after their partner 
assaulted them.127 
The arrival of BWS evidence in Australia in the early 1990s 
exacerbated the trend toward depicting murder defendants as mentally 
abnormal, rather than as rational actors whose behavior could be examined 
for moral appropriateness.  Originally developed by American psychologist 
Lenore Walker, this syndrome theory posits an escalating three-phase cycle 
of violence that includes “tension-building,” an “acute battering incident,” 
and “loving contrition.”  A woman who has experienced the cycle remains 
in the abusive relationship, according to Walker, because she suffers from 
“learned helplessness” that causes her to believe she cannot change her 
circumstances.128  BWS, which is now generally considered a form of post-
traumatic stress disorder,129 does not constitute a separate defense in 
Australia, and part of the problem with it inheres in courts’ mishandling of 
its admissibility.  Australian judges began admitting expert testimony on the 
syndrome with “little or no debate about its nature or relevance . . . [or 
attention] to questions about what the introduction of BWS is intended to 
achieve.”130  Thus, while BWS expert testimony has increasingly been 
paired with social-context evidence in the United States, Australian courts 
construed it narrowly as a psychological explanation of female defendants’ 
behavior, starting “from the notion that battered women have developed 
different perceptions from other people.”131 
BWS evidence underpinned the self-defense claims of several 
Australian women acquitted for killing sleeping husbands.  In each of these 
instances, the deceased issued a verbal death threat or committed a violent 
 
125 Id. at 661, 665 (holding that for a successful self-defense claim, the defendant must 
have reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary, but not requiring that the threat 
must have been imminent); see RENATA ALEXANDER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA: 
THE LEGAL RESPONSE 24, 26 (2002); Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 733. 
126 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 76 (describing pre-reform self-
defense law in Victoria). 
127 LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 46. 
128 WALKER, supra note 14, at 42-63. 
129 Stark, supra note 38, 974. 
130 Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 720-21. 
131 Id. at 722. 
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assault that could be construed as an ongoing threat in close temporal 
proximity to the homicide.132  However, one of Australia’s most 
controversial “sleeping husband” cases, Osland v. Regina,133 demonstrated 
the High Court’s unwillingness to provide strong authority for preemptive 
strikes.  It also suggested the dangers of creating dichotomous images of the 
cold-blooded killer and the pitiable abuse victim with no satisfactory 
intermediate option between a murder verdict and an acquittal. 
Heather Osland spent thirteen years of her life with Frank Osland, a 
man who was significantly taller and heavier than she.134  During this time, 
Frank used violence to maintain rigid control over the household.  His past 
acts against Heather allegedly included repeatedly punching and kicking 
her, holding a gun to her head, pushing her under water in the bath, pulling 
her hair, causing bruises where they would not show, and forcing her to 
have anal intercourse.  He augmented this ongoing cruelty by killing the 
family’s pet rabbits, birds, and a dog, as well as by committing numerous 
acts of violence against the children.135  Efforts to obtain protection from 
the police were ineffectual.136  Heather claimed that, during the days 
immediately preceding Frank’s death, “his violence toward her was 
‘building up.’”137  The deceased ordered Heather’s son David out of the 
house, but David was afraid to leave because of the harm he predicted the 
deceased might inflict on his mother.  Heather and David dug a hole in the 
countryside near Bendigo, Victoria, after becoming fearful that the 
deceased would react violently to their failure to purchase some household 
items.  On the night of the homicide, the deceased inflicted verbal abuse on 
Heather and struck David, knocking him to the ground.  In secret, Heather 
put sleeping tablets in the deceased’s coffee to calm him, but she and her 
son subsequently became alarmed about what the deceased might do when 
he realized he had been drugged.  While the deceased slept, David struck 
him a fatal blow with a piece of metal pipe.  David and Heather then buried 
the deceased and acted as if he had simply disappeared.138 
 
132 Id. at 733-35 (discussing the unreported Tassone case in the Northern Territory, as 
well as DPP v. Secretary, (1996) 5 NTLR 96 (appeal)). 
133 Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R 316. 
134 Id. at 388, ¶ 185 (Callinan, J.) (noting size disparity); Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 61 
(noting the length of the Oslands’ relationship). 
135 See Scutt, supra note 18, at 102-03; see also Osland, 197 C.L.R at 388, ¶ 185 
(Callinan, J.) (remarking on evidence of child abuse and Heather’s testimony about being 
forced to engage in anal intercourse with the deceased); Australian Story: Interview with 
Heather Osland, Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.abc.net.au/ 
austory/content/2005/s1495856.htm (describing the killing of the family dog, Adam). 
136 See Scutt, supra note 18, at 110. 
137 Osland, 197 C.L.R at 321, ¶ 192 (Callinan, J.). 
138 Id. at 321, ¶ 4 (Gaudron & Gummow, JJ., dissenting). 
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Although supporters of Heather Osland castigated “false feminists” for 
daring to suggest that she was not “the best poster child” for the battered 
women’s cause,139 some aspects of the case could be interpreted as signs of 
premeditation.  In addition to the use of sedatives and the hole dug prior to 
the homicide, the prosecution introduced evidence that Heather had offered 
another son money to kill Frank and then threatened him with violence if he 
testified against her.140  Intercepted phone conversations also tended to cast 
doubt on whether Frank had been violent in the later years of their 
marriage.141  Heather relied on BWS evidence and was convicted of murder, 
despite raising both self-defense and provocation claims.  Her conviction 
was upheld on appeal to the High Court.142  Heather’s son, who did not 
claim to suffer from any syndrome, was exonerated in a second trial after a 
hung jury in the first one.143  According to one source, the sentence of 
fourteen years and six months that Heather received ranks among the 
longest in decades in Australia for this type of crime.144 
Australians’ polarized views of the Osland case reflect efforts to 
assimilate complicated facts into a simpler narrative of what happened.  
Heather probably was neither an innocent, passive victim, nor a coldly 
calculating killer.  Because her behavior did not accord with the stereotypes 
that the criminal law, BWS theory, or cultural values surrounding intimate-
partner violence demand, her story had to be reshaped to fit a legal verdict.  
The murder conviction expressed (and the High Court affirmed) a 
distinction between “a self-defensive response to a grave danger which can 
only be understood in light of a history of abusive conduct and a response 
that simply involves a deliberate desire to exact revenge for past and 
potential—but unthreatened—future conduct.”145 
In reality, however, Heather’s behavior may have fallen between these 
understandings of why abuse victims kill.  To the extent that she engaged in 
planning activity by digging the hole and using the sedatives, her conduct 
showed self-protectiveness, as well as anger and desperation.  If she is an 
icon for anything, it may be a new form of mitigation that covers defensive 
killings in which the lethal act is deemed less justifiable than the emotions 
and beliefs prompting it.146  Such a partial defense would have given the 
 
139 See Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 63. 
140 Osland, 197 C.L.R at 316, ¶ 108 (McHugh, J.). 
141 Id. 
142 See generally id. 
143 See Scutt, supra note 18, at 116. 
144 See Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 60. 
145 Osland, 197 C.L.R at 382, ¶ 172 (Kirby, J.). 
146 See infra note 213-23 and accompanying text (discussing excessive self-defense, 
defensive homicide, and imperfect self-defense doctrines).  For a clarification of the 
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Osland jury another option besides provocation, for which there was 
allegedly insufficient evidence of a triggering incident,147 and thus avoided 
an all-or-nothing choice between murder and completely exculpatory self-
defense.  Unfortunately, this type of middle ground was unavailable in 
Heather Osland’s 1996 trial.  Her conviction for murder in Victoria 
announced that her beliefs and actions qualified for neither exoneration nor 
mitigation, whereas James Ramage’s did.148  It was this situation and others 
like it that Victoria’s reformers sought to change. 
B.  MODERN AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTIMATE-PARTNER 
VIOLENCE 
Prior to the 2005 reforms, the law of homicide in Victoria fit poorly 
not only with the social context of intimate-partner killings, but also with 
community values.  Modern Australian society has displayed a growing 
awareness “of the prevalence of domestic violence, its seriousness, and that 
it is a criminal offence.”149  This development owes much to the tireless 
work of feminist reformers, government advertising, and the White Ribbon 
Campaign, a self-funded volunteer effort by a national group of men and 
women from myriad businesses, workplaces, and organizations.150  Such 
moves to educate the general public have met with backlash from men’s 
rights groups and others calling for an acknowledgment that women also 
engage in intimate-partner violence and criticizing allegedly inflated crime 
 
differences between provocation and imperfect self-defense, see note 317 and accompanying 
text. 
147 Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 382, ¶ 170 (Kirby, J.) (opining that the trial judge’s reference 
to a “specific triggering incident” was correct and not properly objected to at trial).  
According to Justice Kirby, “[e]vidence of a long-term abusive relationship, even if 
accepted, did not afford a person in the position of the appellant a blank cheque to plan and 
execute the homicide of her abuser, protected by the law of provocation, with only a passing 
nod at the immediate circumstances said to have driven her to the grave step of participating 
in the termination of a human life.”  Id. 
148 The manslaughter sentence that Ramage received fell well below the statutory 
maximum of twenty years, although it was a comparatively severe sentence for provocation 
manslaughter in Victoria.  See McSherry, supra note 104, at 17.  Victoria’s Sentencing 
Advisory Council report noted, however, that Ramage’s sentence “was the second highest 
sentence for provocation manslaughter” during 1998-2007.  PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, 
supra note 10, at 83 & app. at 3 fig.11. 
149 Mandy McKenzie, Backlash and Beyond: Shifts in Community Attitudes to Domestic 
Violence, 1 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & INCEST RESOURCE Q. 16-22 (2007) (on file with author). 
150 Michael Flood, Secrets and Lies: Responding to Attacks on Domestic Violence 
Campaigns, AUSTL. DOMESTIC & FAM. VIOLENCE CLEARINGHOUSE NEWSL. 3 (Univ. New. 
South Wales), Summer 2006/2007 (describing the White Ribbon Campaign), available at 
http://www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au/Other_%20publications/Flood.pdf. 
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statistics that place blame on men.151  Yet, despite some dissonance, only 
one in five Australians believed that a man’s use of physical force against 
his wife was justified under any circumstances in 1988.152  And the trend 
away from viewing intimate-partner violence as “just a domestic” has 
continued to grow. 
Part II of this Article showed that the Australian government punished 
wife-killers with prison sentences or even the death penalty in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.153  The greatest change in social 
attitudes in our own time began with the explicitly feminist women’s refuge 
movement of the 1970s and the law-reform efforts of the 1980s, which 
included the establishment of task forces in every Australian state and 
territory to collect material on the circumstances and experiences of 
domestic violence victims.154  These state task forces helped spur the 
criminalization of spousal abuse, stalking, marital rape, and the breach of a 
protective order.155  Their efforts also led to the modification of search-and-
seizure laws to give officers greater authority to investigate domestic 
violence calls.156  Although three Australian states now appear to be 
international trendsetters in abolishing provocation, the United States 
served as a model for many of these earlier reforms.157 
Battered women’s advocates continue to face challenges in Australia.  
Shelters are overcrowded and underfunded;158 the prevalence of plea 
bargaining and discretionary sentencing sometimes undercuts doctrinal 
reforms;159 and the police and courts only sporadically enforce protective 
orders.160  The Australian public has also proved reluctant to discard the 
widespread belief that excessive alcohol consumption causes intimate 
 
151 See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 109; Flood, supra note 150, at 3-4; 
McKenzie, supra note 149, at 16. 
152 See Jane Mugford, Stephen Mugford & Patricia Weiser Easteal, Social Justice, Public 
Perceptions, and Spouse Assault in Australia, 16 SOC. JUST. 103, 118 (1989). 
153 See supra text accompanying notes 65, 71-72. 
154 See Judith Allen, Policing Since 1880: Some Questions of Sex, in POLICING IN 
AUSTRALIA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Mark Finnane ed., 1987) (“[T]he distinctive activity 
of contemporary feminists has been the establishment of women’s refuges, rape crisis 
centres and young women’s shelters, staffed by feminists, funded by the state.”); Mugford et 
al., supra note 152, at 112-13 (describing the work of the domestic violence task forces). 
155 See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 115; Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 114. 
156 See RENATA ALEXANDER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA: THE LEGAL RESPONSE 
24, 33-43 (2002) (explaining changes in criminal procedure). 
157 See Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 113. 
158 Id. at 105-06. 
159 See ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 33, 52; KILLING THE BELOVED, supra note 1, at 
148, 173, 182. 
160 See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 113; KILLING THE BELOVED, supra note 1, at 
77-78, 91. 
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violence.161  Nevertheless, an emerging consensus unsympathetic to sexual 
rage killings has made the expansive modern provocation doctrine the 
flashpoint for reform in several Australian states. 
When Victoria abolished the partial defense in 2005, the move was 
characterized as an effort to bring the criminal law into line with 
community values.162  Public sentiment inflamed by the availability of heat-
of-passion mitigation in the widely-reported Ramage case163 coincided with 
independent efforts by the VLRC to rethink homicide defenses.  Communal 
outrage at James Ramage’s ability to escape a murder conviction centered 
on the way the defense lawyer vilified the dead victim to generate empathy 
for the defendant’s loss of self-control.164  The legal outcome may have 
been offensive to the public because it represented a mode of thinking about 
sexual rage killings that is disfavored; indeed, some evidence indicates that, 
at the time of the Ramage trial, Australian courts and juries were already 
“becoming more reluctant to accept the partial defense of provocation” in 
such cases.165 
 
161 See Renata Alexander, Wife-Battering—An Australian Perspective, 8 J. FAM. 
VIOLENCE 229, 244 (1993); Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 108. 
162 See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (discussing the groundswell of 
community sentiment favoring the abolition of the provocation doctrine in Victoria). 
163 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
164 See Karen Kissane, Honour Killing in the Suburbs, AGE (Austl.), Nov. 6, 2004, at 4-5; 
Victoria to Scrap Provocation Defence to Murder, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Austl.), Jan. 20, 
2005, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1285812.htm (noting that 
the abolition of the provocation defense in Victoria followed “an outcry by campaigners over 
an eleven-year manslaughter sentence handed to a Balwyn businessman who was cleared of 
murdering his wife”); see also CLEARY, supra note 104, at 43, 137-38, 162, 170, 176, 179 
(criticizing the outcome on grounds similar to those described in the press).  The case 
became the subject of a popular book by footballer-turned-activist Phil Cleary, whose own 
sister had been murdered by a former boyfriend in Melbourne and who had become a 
crusader against the provocation defense.  See generally CLEARY, supra note 104 (presenting 
a somewhat sensational account of the Ramage case); Susanna Lobez, Killer of a Quandary, 
SUNDAY SUN HERALD (Austl.), Sept. 22, 2002, at 75 (noting Cleary’s advocacy of the 
Victorian reforms and his personal connection to the provocation doctrine arising from the 
murder of his sister by a man who subsequently served only three and a half years in prison).  
Cleary noted that it was “sad that it had taken a ‘society’ killing [of wealthy Melbournite 
Julie Ramage] to strike up a debate about the ‘barbaric’ provocation defence strategy.”  
Stuart Walsh & Mairza Fiamengo, Wife Killer Gets 11 Years for Manslaughter: Call for 
Change, GEELONG ADVERTISER, Dec. 10, 2004, at 4. 
165 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 41 & n.142; see Lobez, supra note 
164, at 75 (reporting that, in 2002, Victoria Appeal Court Justice Norman O’Bryan rejected 
the appeal of a man who killed his estranged girlfriend for insulting him and declared that 
“the defence of provocation had outlived its usefulness”); see also Howe, supra note 63, at 
59 (“[I]n some jurisdictions, notably Australia, appeals against murder convictions in wife-
killing and homosexual advance killings are not succeeding like they used to.”). 
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Public criticism of the Ramage verdict and sentence dovetailed with 
academic efforts to expose the social context of intimate-partner homicide 
and the gender bias of the criminal law.  A growing body of empirical 
research suggests that men primarily kill in the intimate context to retain 
control over their partners, while women most often use lethal violence 
when they fear being killed or injured by a man.166  Tasmania abolished the 
partial defense of provocation in 2003, acknowledging this feminist 
criticism.167  When the VLRC recommended the same move as part of a 
comprehensive reform package, it expressly relied on a paper by law 
professor Jenny Morgan as well as other social scientific findings about the 
differing reasons that men and women kill.168  The Ramage case did not 
affect the VLRC report, which was derived from established research and 
printed before the controversial verdict.169  Nevertheless, the case likely 
influenced the state parliament’s speedy adoption of the VLRC 
recommendations. 
The reforms in Victoria and Tasmania in turn sparked reconsideration 
of homicide defenses in several other Australian states.  Since Victoria 
enacted its reforms in 2005, controversial verdicts in intimate homicide 
cases have fueled public demands to abolish provocation in other parts of 
Australia.170  Law reform commissions or ad hoc bodies in Queensland, 
New South Wales, and Western Australia have proposed changes to 
homicide defenses, but thus far all except Western Australia have stopped 
short of abolishing the provocation doctrine.171  For example, when 
 
166 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 42, at 23-29 (analyzing various studies); Margo I. 
Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings?  On the Exceptional Sex Ratio 
of Spousal Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206-09 (1992) (discussing 
data on the United States). 
167 Rebecca Bradfield, Comment, The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania, 27 CRIM. L.J. 
322, 323 (2003) (listing the reasons Tasmania’s Attorney General provided for abolishing 
provocation). 
168 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 29-30; Morgan, supra note 42, at 23-
29  However, I will argue that the VLRC proposals went beyond trying to level the gendered 
playing field to reframing homicide defenses in terms of moral evaluations of conduct.  See 
infra notes 180-83, 187-91 and accompanying text. 
169 Telephone Conversation with Jenny Morgan, Professor, Melbourne Law School, Mar. 
24, 2008; see also CLEARY, supra note 104, at 190 (noting that the VLRC Final Report had 
already been printed when the jury delivered its verdict in the Ramage case). 
170 See, e.g., Defence Can Blame Victim for a Crime, COURIER-MAIL (Austl.), July 6, 
2007, at 26 (reporting that the unsuccessful campaign to abolish provocation in Queensland 
“was driven by the mother of 16-year-old Taryn Hunt, who was brutally clubbed to death 
with a steering wheel lock by her former boyfriend, 30-year-old Damian Karl Sebo”); 
Emmaline Stigwood, Sebo Acquittal Sparks Calls for Law Reform, GOLD COAST BULL., July 
4, 2007, at 12 (making a similar report). 
171 See LAW REFORM COMM’N OF W. AUSTL., REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE FINAL 
REPORT 329 (2007) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE] (recommending the 
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Queensland reassessed its defenses to murder in 2008,172 the Queensland 
Law Reform Commission proposed recasting, rather than abolishing, the 
provocation defense.173  By contrast, that same year, Western Australia 
replaced provocation manslaughter with the new crime of “unlawful assault 
causing death,” acknowledging its debt to the VLRC, and also revamped its 
self-defense provisions. 174 
C.  MOVING AWAY FROM PARTIAL EXCUSES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF VICTORIA’S HOMICIDE LAW REFORM PACKAGE 
The precursor to Victoria’s reforms—the abolition of provocation in 
Tasmania in 2003—proceeded on relatively impoverished theoretical and 
policy foundations.  The two most important rationales seem to have been, 
first, that the repeal of Tasmania’s mandatory death sentence for murder 
made heat-of-passion mitigation in the guilt phase unnecessary and, second, 
that the partial defense tacitly endorsed male violence prompted by a man’s 
 
abolition of the provocation defense and changes to self-defense law), available at 
http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/097-FR.html; LENNY ROTH, N.S.W. PARLIAMENT, 
PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENCE IN INTIMATE PARTNER AND HOMOPHOBIC HOMICIDES 12 
(N.S.W. Parliamentary Libr. Res. Serv. Briefing Paper No. 3/07, 2007) [hereinafter NSW 
BRIEFING PAPER] (stating that, in 1997, the NSW Law Reform Commission recommended 
retaining but reformulating the provocation defense), available at 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/2283257FD5435499CA
2572C30009E286/$File/provocation&INDEX%20FINAL.pdf.  For journalistic discussion of 
these reform proposals, see, for example, Amanda Banks, New Defence Planned for Battered 
Wives, AUSTRALIAN, May 16, 2006, at 7 (noting that the Western Australian Law Reform 
Commission proposed abolishing provocation and introducing a separate defense for 
battered women).  But cf. Call for Calm on Murder Law, COURIER MAIL (Austl.), July 7, 
2007, at 12 (“[Queensland] Attorney-General Kerry Shine has warned against any ‘knee-jerk 
reaction’ to abolish the defence of provocation following a controversial manslaughter 
case.”). 
172 See generally QUEENSL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, A REVIEW OF THE EXCUSE OF 
ACCIDENT AND THE DEFENSE OF PROVOCATION (No. 64, 2008) [hereinafter QLRC, A 
REVIEW] (reviewing the law of provocation and making reform proposals), available at 
http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/reports/R%2064.pdf. 
173 Id. at 474. 
174 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, §§ 8, 12 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No. 
29/2008).  The superseding provision allows for criminal liability even for unforeseeable 
deaths caused by the defendant’s assault.  Id. § 12.  However, it is unclear that this 
substitution will prevent angry men who formerly could have raised successful provocation 
claims from being convicted of lesser crimes than murder.  For the influence of the VLRC 
final report on reforms in Western Australia, see, for example, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF 
HOMICIDE, supra note 171, at 276, 280.  Changes in self-defense law, including the 
introduction of the mitigating doctrine of excessive self-defense in Western Australia, will 
be discussed infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text. 
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inability to control his spouse.175  Tasmanian Director of Public 
Prosecutions Tim Ellis further described the provocation doctrine as 
inconsistent “with the expectations of a civilised society.”176  However, 
abolition in Tasmania occurred without being explained or theorized in a 
law-reform report, and perhaps most importantly, it constituted a stand-
alone measure that struck from the law a partial defense upon which female 
as well as male defendants had relied.  No evidentiary changes were 
introduced to make it easier for battered women charged with murder to 
convince the jury that they had acted in self-defense, and no substitute for 
provocation was enacted.  For some Australian feminists, Tasmania’s 
surgical strike raised a grave concern that eliminating the provocation 
doctrine would actually “worsen the legal position of battered women who 
kill.”177  Nevertheless, the Tasmanian Parliament voted unanimously for the 
measure.178 
In contrast, the reform package enacted in Victoria emerged from a 
long deliberation process in which numerous individuals and groups 
enjoyed input and was underpinned by a detailed report that explained the 
theoretical and policy grounds for interconnected changes to homicide 
defenses.  The reforms are often described as embodying a substantive 
equality position designed to remediate perceived gender imbalances in the 
impact of the law,179 and indeed, these objectives suffused the report.  But 
scrutiny of the VLRC recommendations discloses an additional theoretical 
foundation—chiefly, a moral objection to the existing doctrine’s failure “to 
distinguish sufficiently between values and beliefs the law should and 
should not tolerate.”180 
The report proposed, as a general matter, that partial excuses be taken 
into account at sentencing, not in the guilt phase.181  Rather than mitigating 
the severity of the conviction based on the defendant’s irrationality or poor 
impulse-control, the revised law should assess whether the defendant killed 
 
175 Bradfield, supra note 167, at 324.  Reformers in Victoria similarly noted that the 
death penalty in that state was abolished in 1975.  PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 
10, at 7. 
176 Ellen Whinnett, Murder Law to Be Changed, MERCURY (Hobart, Austl.), Sept. 5, 
2002, at 9. 
177 Bradfield, supra note 167, at 324. 
178 Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 93, at 57. 
179 Id. at 28, 56; Reg Graycar & Jenny Morgan, Feminist Legal Theory and 
Understandings of Equality: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 399, 407 (2006) (discussing the VLRC report). 
180 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 34. 
181 See id. at xxvii. 
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for morally appropriate reasons.182  The VLRC thus drew a moral and legal 
line in the guilt phase between killings based on impermissible emotions 
like a desire for sexual revenge and those arising, to a large degree, from 
self-protection.  The emphasis on moral judgment and the disfavoring of 
partial excuses represent two of the most important contributions of the 
Commission’s work; yet, as I will argue below, the proposals sometimes 
strayed from this position in places they ought to have stuck to it.183 
1.  Shifting Provocation to the Sentencing Phase 
The abolition of provocation as a partial defense to murder constituted 
the centerpiece of Victoria’s reforms; the state parliament implemented this 
VLRC proposal in the Crimes (Homicide) Act of 2005.184  The VLRC 
grounded its recommendation in social scientific evidence that men commit 
75% of intimate-partner homicides in Australia each year and that many of 
these men allege provocation.185  While women accused of murder in 
Victoria could successfully raise the partial defense under pre-reform law, 
those who did so typically killed in response to fear-inducing sexual or 
physical assaults by a domestic partner, rather than loss of self-control 
stemming from a partner leaving, threatening to leave, or starting a new 
sexual relationship with another person.186  The VLRC critique of this 
situation provided a moral assessment of the differing scenarios in which 
men and women generally claim to have been provoked: “These two 
circumstances, it is suggested, should not be seen as comparable . . . .  The 
Commission believes the problems with the defense go beyond gender 
bias.”187 
First, the VLRC evaluated loss of self-control as a partial excuse and 
concluded that, short of a completely exculpatory mental impairment, “we 
should expect people to control their impulses [no matter] what provocation 
is offered.”188  Loss of self-control fails to “provide a sufficient reason, 
moral or legal, to distinguish [provoked] killers from cold-blooded 
 
182 The executive summary of the VLRC report announced that “in the twenty-first-
century, the Victorian community has a right to expect people will control their behaviour, 
even when angry or emotionally upset.”  Id. at xxi. 
183 See infra text accompanying notes 210-12, 218-23, 232-37. 
184 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 3b (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). 
185 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxv (citing empirical research 
suggesting that female defendants in New South Wales fare better than male defendants 
when claiming provocation). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 27. 
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killers.”189  The Commission described this as “one of the most compelling 
reasons for abolishing the [provocation] defence.”190  Second, the VLRC 
declined to authorize victim-blaming in the context of infidelity, separation, 
or divorce, which it characterized as an exercise of “personal rights to leave 
a relationship or start a new [one].”191 
Abolishing provocation in the guilt phase does not necessarily mean 
eliminating it completely.  Rather, the VLRC final report recommended that 
it be considered, along with other factors, at sentencing.192  Of course, 
shifting consideration of provocation claims from trial to sentencing creates 
the possibility that defendants will simply receive leniency at a different 
stage.  This occurred in the American state of Texas, which in 1993 
abolished voluntary manslaughter as a separate offense and deferred 
consideration of passion claims until sentencing.193  However, in Victoria, a 
report under the aegis of the Sentencing Advisory Council (SAC)—an 
independent statutory body composed of criminal lawyers, victims’ 
advocates, academics, and others with experience in the criminal justice 
system—attempted to foreclose such a scenario by proposing standards for 
limiting provocation-based leniency in punishment determinations.194  The 
publication of these recommendations followed the enactment of changes to 




191 Id. at 56. 
192 Id. at xxvii.  This move included a reallocation of burdens.  When provocation was 
taken into account in the guilt phase, the prosecutor bore the burden of showing that the 
defendant did not act in the heat of passion, whereas in the sentencing phase, the prisoner 
must show that he or she was provoked.  See PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 
26. 
193 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d) (2003); see 43 TEX. PRAC., CRIM. PRAC. AND PROC. 
§ 31.95 (2d. ed., 2008); David Crump, “Murder, Pennsylvania Style”: Comparing 
Traditional Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions, 109 W. VA. L. 
REV. 257, 316-17 (2007).  A Texas defendant bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he “caused the death under the immediate influence of 
sudden passion arising from an adequate cause,” and, if he succeeds, his offense is reduced 
to a second-degree felony carrying a maximum sentence of twenty years.  TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. §§ 12.32-33, 19.02(d) (2003).  Yet, in reality, intimate murderers who commit 
separation assaults in Texas may only serve a tiny fraction of that range.  In 1998, for 
example, Jimmy Watkins returned to the family home in Fort Worth and fatally shot his 
estranged wife and injured her boyfriend.  The jury convicted him of murder but 
recommended a probationary sentence because Watkins acted in the sudden heat of passion.  
A judge then sentenced the prisoner to a $10,000 fine and ten years’ probation, only four 
months of which were to be served in custody.  LEE, supra note 14, at 42-43. 
194 PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 93.  One of the report’s authors, 
Professor and SAC Chair Arie Freiberg, clarified in an email that, while the report was 
discussed generally by the Council, it was not formally proposed or adopted by it. 
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report, Provocation in Sentencing, authored by Felicity Stewart and Arie 
Freiberg, as “an important resource when courts [begin] the task of 
sentencing of offenders convicted of murder rather than manslaughter under 
the new law.”195  However, because few cases have come before the courts 
yet, the impact of these recommendations remains unclear. 
Provocation in Sentencing endorsed the VLRC’s general approach of 
examining the reasons the accused killed and making “judgments about the 
values and views that drove the accused’s decision to act.”196  According to 
the SAC report, provocation should be seen as a justifying doctrine, not as 
an excuse for loss of self-control, even at sentencing: “[T]he crucial 
question is whether the provocation gave the offender a justifiable sense of 
being wronged.”197  Thus, a provocation claim at sentencing should only 
mitigate punishment if the defendant had a valid moral basis for feeling 
outraged.  Some of the old provocation categories, such as assault on a 
close relative, would qualify, and some newer ones like fury over a racial 
slur might also meet the test.198  However, according to the SAC report, 
outrage at an intimate partner’s decision to end the relationship could not be 
justified because each partner should be able to make an autonomous choice 
to leave.  Even if this behavior causes emotional pain, trying to obstruct it 
and regain control over the straying spouse is never morally appropriate.199  
The SAC report thus insisted that moral judgments be underpinned by an 
equality norm; women should be as free as men to terminate a relationship 
and not be punished for attempting to do so by men’s greater tendency 
toward lethal violence.200 
2.  Expanding the Doctrine of Self-Defense 
The expansion of self-defense constituted a necessary corollary to the 
abolition of provocation.  Prior to the reforms, Victoria was the only 
 
195 Geoff Wilkinson, No Let Off for Wife Killers: Report Urges Judges to Ignore 
Provocation, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Feb. 7, 2008, at 23. 
196 PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 93. 
197 Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
198 The SAC report recommended: 
Conduct of the victim which consists of a single racial taunt, while it is to be deplored, may not 
be sufficient in itself to lessen the culpability of an offender . . . .  However, the context of the 
comment, including whether it included threatening undertones or occurred against a background 
of discrimination, is relevant to whether the offenders aggrievement is justified and, along with 
the degree of disproportionality between the comment and the offence, is relevant to whether—
and to what degree—the offender’s culpability should be reduced. 
Id. at 73. 
199 Id. 
200 See supra notes 41-42,185 and accompanying text (discussing gender imbalance in 
the perpetration of intimate-partner homicides).  
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Australian state that relied on common law principles of self-defense, rather 
than having a statutory provision, so codification was a threshold goal.201  
Then, rather than introducing a separate defense for battered women who 
kill their abusers, the VLRC report recommended two steps—reforming 
self-defense law to make it more inclusive of women’s experiences and 
adopting a partial defense of excessive self-defense to provide mitigation 
for defendants who honestly but unreasonably believed in the necessity of 
lethal action.  In either case, the defendant’s conduct would likely be fear-
based, though the existence of anger would not negate the claim unless it 
constituted a “premeditated desire for revenge.”202 
Perhaps the most significant feature of this self-defense proposal was 
its assertion that “[t]here may be circumstances in which the accused’s 
belief in the need to take action is reasonably held where the danger is not 
immediate, but is inevitable.”203  In other words, action in self-defense 
might be necessary when the defendant believed it was “only a matter of 
time” before the deceased inflicted death or serious injury and the defendant 
lacked an alternate means of self-protection.204  Another notable aspect of 
the VLRC proposal involved proportionality, which the pre-reform law in 
Victoria did not expressly require.  The VLRC declined to impose a strict 
proportionality element due to common size-and-strength disparities 
between aggressors and those they attack and the fact that women may use 
a weapon or choose a non-confrontational moment to strike their abusers in 
compensation for such disparities.205 
In short, the VLRC recommendations essentially proposed codifying 
preemptive strikes as potentially reasonable, depending on the 
circumstances, in cases where the deceased posed an ongoing, unlawful 
threat of death or serious injury to the accused.  This recommendation 
proved influential.  The self-defense provision enacted statutorily in 
Victoria in 2005 tracked the VLRC proposal by omitting any requirements 
of proportionality or imminence,206 and the 2008 homicide amendments in 
 
201 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxviii. 
202 Id. at 91. 
203 Id. at 80. 
204 Id. 
205 See id. at 83-84. 
206 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (9AC) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).  Several scholars 
have presented convincing arguments against an imminence requirement.  See Burke, supra 
note 18, at 274, 282-83, 297-98; Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women 
Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 410 (1993) (“[I]n appropriate cases the 
imminence requirement can be eliminated without undermining the basic fabric of the self-
defense laws.”).  Since this Article concentrates on partial defenses, it will not dwell on an 
aspect of total exculpation that others have skillfully covered.  However, the elimination of 
the proportionality requirement is potentially more troubling.  How could a violent response 
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Western Australia expressly allowed self-defense acquittals of defendants 
who used deadly force to defend themselves or another person “from a 
harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent.”207 
Past abuse often demonstrates the inappropriateness of the traditional 
self-defense elements of imminence and strict proportionality for assessing 
reasonableness.  For this reason, Victoria also adopted evidentiary 
provisions in family violence cases to clarify what evidence is relevant to 
the question of whether the defendant had a reasonable belief in the 
necessity of her actions.208  In Victoria, this evidence now encompasses 
relationship history, including past violence and social, cultural, and 
economic factors affecting the defendant, as well as expert testimony on the 
psychological impact and social context of domestic violence.209 
However, Victoria did not go far enough toward envisioning a system 
in which abuse victims can be defended without psychological experts.  
Because BWS evidence will still be used under the reformed law, the risk 
remains that judges, expert witnesses, and defense attorneys will continue 
to pathologize and stereotype the accused.  The BWS theory casts 
defendants as dysfunctional and excludes a range of female experience, 
including that of aboriginal and other minority women whom researchers 
believe are more likely than white women to fight back against violent 
partners and whose behavior thus does not fit the paradigm of learned 
 
to an assault or threat be disproportionate and yet still be necessary?  There are several 
scenarios in which this paradox is easy to resolve.  For example, a woman presumably could 
shoot an attacker with a gun, even if he were unarmed, if he tried to strangle her.  The strict 
proportionality of a bare-hands killing would not be required under these circumstances, 
especially given a likely disparity in size and strength.  She could also use deadly force to 
ward off a rape or kidnapping.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962) (providing that 
deadly force can be used to protect against rape or kidnapping); Douglas Husak, Partial 
Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167, 184 (1998) (“[M]ost jurisdictions allow a 
defendant to use deadly force . . . to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, 
kidnapping or forcible sexual intercourse.”).  But could she shoot her attacker if he punched 
her with his fist?  Under traditional self-defense principles, an individual could not kill in 
response to a mere punch, and she certainly could not do so if the would-be attacker only 
threatened to punch her in the future.  The answer for a battered woman should be identical, 
unless her experience of domestic violence has taught her that the next blow will be lethal or 
unless the relationship in which she is trapped can be analogized to a hostage situation.  Cf.  
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 92 (suggesting that courts might have a different perspective on 
cases of battered women who kill during non-confrontational moments if they saw such 
defendants in “the paradigm of hostages resisting their captors”).  This makes the 
admissibility of past-abuse evidence crucial. 
207 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 8 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No. 
29/2008) (emphasis added). 
208 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AH) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). 
209 Id. 
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helplessness.210  By contrast, factors including prior violence and threats; 
unsuccessful attempts to seek help from friends, family, the police, and 
other government agencies; the lack of a safe place to go; and financial 
constraints can all be framed as traditionally admissible evidence.211  
Indeed, such information has been introduced to defend abused women 
since the nineteenth century.212  Even if an expert witness is employed, such 
testimony should address the social framework, rather than the pathological 
aspects of BWS. 
While revamping self-defense constitutes an important component of 
feminist homicide law reform, Victoria failed to reclaim this exculpatory 
doctrine as a justification for battered women charged with murder by 
ridding it of the excuse-inflected baggage of BWS.  Thus, the state 
parliament may have opened the door to allegations that it abolished 
mitigation for men who lose control, while expanding psychological 
excuses for women. 
3.  A New Partial Defense for Self-Protective Killings 
The adoption of a new mitigating doctrine, short of total exculpation, 
constituted the second half of the VLRC’s proposed reform of self-defense.  
The Commission recommended that Victoria reintroduce excessive self-
defense “as a ‘halfway house’ for cases where self-defense is not 
successful, but where manslaughter is the more appropriate outcome” than 
murder.213  Although the Commission envisioned excessive self-defense as 
a safety net in family violence cases, it was not to be limited to intimate-
partner homicides, but would also extend to other scenarios in which the 
defendant used “a level of force that is grossly excessive or otherwise 
 
210 Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 372-73, ¶ 161 (Kirby, J.) (contending that BWS 
“is based largely on the experiences of Caucasian women of a particular social background.  
Their ‘passive’ responses may be different than those of women with different economic or 
ethnic backgrounds”); Note on Hickey: The Problems with a Psychological Approach to 
Domestic Violence, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 365 (1993) (arguing the BWS does not fit the 
experiences of Aboriginals in Australia); see also HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK 
WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 115-38 (2008) (presenting qualitative 
sociological findings, based on interviews with abuse survivors, about how black women 
physically fight back against intimate-partner violence). 
211 Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to 
Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 566 (2007). 
212 See supra notes 83-84, 88 and accompanying text. 
213 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 94.  Previously, in 1987, the Zecevic 
case had eliminated excessive self-defense claims in Victoria.  Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. 
Prosecutions (Vict.) (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, 664 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.) 
(criticizing excessive self-defense for being too complicated). 
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unreasonable.”214  Practically speaking, the Commission hoped the 
existence of a trial outcome between a murder conviction and an acquittal 
might encourage more defendants to go to trial, rather than to plead guilty 
to charges that did not really fit the circumstances in which they killed.215 
In the end, the Parliament of Victoria enacted a new crime called 
“defensive homicide” that bears the same penalty as manslaughter—no 
statutory minimum sentence and a maximum of twenty years in prison.216  
The difference from excessive self-defense seems to be mostly expressive.  
Under the provision the parliament enacted, the conviction literally 
incorporates the concept of “defense,” which lessens the stigma to those 
who honestly sought to protect themselves or their families.  Defensive 
homicide may also be broader than excessive self-defense.  Under the 
excessive self-defense statute recently enacted in Western Australia, for 
example, a defendant will be convicted of manslaughter if her act would be 
treated as self-defense “but for the fact that the act is not a reasonable 
response by the person in the circumstances as the person believes them to 
be.”217  The focus in Western Australia therefore rests on the excessiveness 
of the response, rather than on the defendant’s unreasonable perception that 
she was being threatened or attacked.  Manslaughter mitigation on these 
grounds may apply to a smaller group of cases than under Victoria’s new 
law. 
Will defensive homicide operate as a partial justification or a partial 
excuse in Victoria?  The VLRC report described its proposed mitigating 
claim as the latter and conceded some inconsistency with its overall 
preference for leaving such matters for sentencing.218  Yet these partial 
 
214 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 101.  The concept of a grossly 
excessive level of force hints that a minimal proportionality requirement has been smuggled 
into self-defense, thus satisfying a concern that I raised above. See supra note 206. 
215 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxix. 
216 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AD) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). 
217 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 8 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No. 
29/2008). 
218 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 101.  Marcia Neave, the chairperson 
of the VLRC at the time the final report was drafted, described the provision of a partial 
excuse as an exception to the “guiding principle in the report . . . that differences in degrees 
of culpability generally should be dealt with through the sentencing process.”  Marcia 
Neave, Homicide Sentences: Taking Culpability into Account, 86 REFORM 33 (2005) (on file 
with author).  Imperfect or excessive self-defense doctrines are often depicted as excuses in 
the academic literature, as well.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse 
Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 336 (1998) (indicating 
that imperfect self-defense claims by defendants who honestly but unreasonably believed 
they needed to use deadly force operate as partial excuses); cf. George P. Fletcher, 
Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 576-78 
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defenses could instead be characterized as partial justifications based on 
fear of unlawful violence.  The latter rationale would preserve the focus on 
whether the defendant’s valuation embodied an appropriate moral 
judgment.  The distinction between acts and beliefs that Cynthia Lee 
proposes is helpful here.  As Lee argues, even though a defendant’s belief in 
the need to use force may be reasonable, her “conduct may not be 
reasonable either because the force used was not proportionate to the harm 
threatened or because other, less drastic, alternatives were available.”219  
The reasonable emotion or belief only partially legitimates the defendant’s 
act. 
Creating a partial defense for self-protective homicides has much to 
recommend it.  It is preferable to misguided efforts to retain expansive 
versions of the provocation or EMED doctrines to defend battered women 
who kill their abusers,220 for such efforts simply create a broader and more 
permissive safe haven for angry men than nineteenth-century doctrines ever 
did.221  It also has the potential to provide mitigation to defendants who 
formerly would have claimed provocation in scenarios other than sexual 
rage killings.  For example, a defendant who committed homicide when 
faced with a non-lethal attack by an aggressor other than an intimate 
partner, or who witnessed a family member being victimized by such an 
attack, might have killed in honest but objectively unreasonable defense of 
 
(1996) (arguing that a battered woman who kills her sleeping abuser can be excused, but not 
justified, because she acted on an instinct of self-preservation). 
219 Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual 
Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 221 (1998) (emphasis 
added); see also LEE, supra note 14, at 269-73; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 288 
(making a distinction between “having the emotion and acting in accordance with it”).  
Explaining Victoria’s defensive homicide provision in this manner is more difficult, though, 
because it also seems to mitigate claims based on unreasonable beliefs and emotions. 
220 According the VLRC final report, “In submissions and during consultations, 
particular concern was expressed about the likely consequences of removing provocation as 
a safety net for women who kill violent partners, but who are unable to successfully argue 
self-defence . . . .  There was some support for the abolition of provocation to be delayed 
until self-defence could be shown to offer women who kill in response to violence a true 
defence.”  VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 38-39; see Howe, supra note 63, 
at 54 (noting that some feminist groups in Britain urged the British Law Commission to 
reform the provocation doctrine, rather than abolish it, because there was no other safety net 
for battered women). 
221 See supra notes 43-72 and accompanying text (describing strict limits on provocation 
mitigation for men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).  Zealous defense 
attorneys will likely seek to cast the homicidal acts of enraged male clients as “defensive 
homicide,” and such moves may be successful, but the new defense still limits the 
circumstances eligible for mitigation by requiring an honest belief that deadly force was 
necessary. 
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herself or a close relative.222  Finally, a defensive homicide law allows for 
lesser convictions and sentences under appropriate circumstances without 
treating either women or men as if their actions arise from a mental 
condition.223 
4.  Other Partial Defenses to Murder 
When considering other partial defenses to murder, lawmakers in 
Victoria displayed inconsistency in their commitment to curtailing excuse-
based doctrines.  The decision not to introduce a diminished responsibility 
defense in Victoria provides evidence that the Commission and the state 
parliament, in the main, sought to eschew excuses based on irrationality or 
loss of self-control.224  However, the VLRC’s characterization of excessive 
self-defense as a partial excuse was not the only instance of deviation from 
its core message.  The adoption of other homicide defenses, such as duress, 
paired with continued reliance on BWS evidence, weakened the reformers’ 
bid to articulate a coherent theory of criminal responsibility. 
i.  Diminished Responsibility 
“Diminished responsibility,” also known as “partial responsibility,” is 
a doctrine used in some European countries and four Australian states that 
entitles the defendant to a reduction in the severity of his sentence, even 
though the prosecutor has proved all elements of the crime.  In Britain and 
Australia, the defense reduces murder to manslaughter.  In contrast, in the 
United States, a different doctrine called “diminished capacity” operates to 
negate the required mens rea.225  The diminished or partial responsibility 
 
222 The SAC report reached a similar conclusion, stating: 
As a result of the abolition of the partial defence [of provocation], it would be expected that 
offenders found guilty of murder under the new law would generally receive more severe 
sentences than those previously found guilty of provocation manslaughter.  However, not all 
people who might previously have been found guilty of provocation manslaughter will 
necessarily be convicted of murder under the new law.  Some may instead be acquitted after 
successfully raising self-defence; others may be found guilty of defensive homicide or unlawful 
and dangerous act manslaughter . . . . 
PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 31. 
223 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 102. 
224 Id. at 232 (“The Commission’s view and final recommendations in relation to 
diminished responsibility have been influenced by its views about partial excuses 
generally—that is, that there must be compelling reasons for making them available at 
all . . . .”). 
225 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 393-94 (4th ed. 2006); SANFORD 
KADISH, STEPHEN SCHULHOFER & CAROL STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 910 
(8th ed. 2007). 
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defense remains controversial in the United States and has only been 
adopted in a few states.226 
Diminished responsibility can be faulted on the grounds that it will 
lead to specious claims and that it fails to hold defendants who are not 
legally insane fully accountable for their actions.  Moreover, it raises the 
specter of increased public danger if it reduces general and specific 
deterrence.227  Because it tends to arouse intense popular opposition, it may 
also have a corrosive effect on societal respect for the criminal law.228 
Beyond this litany of familiar crime-control objections, adding 
diminished responsibility to Victoria’s homicide law would have negated 
many of the other reforms the VLRC persuaded the state parliament to 
adopt.  Chiefly, it would have given jealous, controlling spouses a 
mitigating claim even after the provocation doctrine was eliminated.229  It 
also might have become the default for juries reluctant to exculpate battered 
women who killed their abusers, thus perpetuating disease theories of 
family violence.  As reformers in Western Australia noted in their 
comparable critique of this partial defense, “the focus on the psychology of 
the victim of domestic violence who kills can obscure the true reason the 
victim killed the deceased: the history of domestic violence.”230  Rejecting 
the diminished responsibility defense thus constituted a wise step away 
from labeling female defendants as mentally impaired. 231 
 
226 DRESSLER, supra note 225, at 394, 399.  California abolished the defense in the 1980s, 
after it was successfully used to defend Dan White against charges that he murdered San 
Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk.  See generally People v. 
Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991) (providing a thorough discussion of the history of the 
doctrine in California); see also WILSON, supra note 11, at 125-28 (discussing Dan White’s 
successful diminished responsibility claim); Carolyn  B. Ramsey, California’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Act: The Role of Psychiatrists, Courts, and Medical Determinations in 
Confining Sex Offenders, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 469, 497 (1999) (noting the abolition of 
diminished capacity or diminished responsibility mitigation in California).  Dr. Martin 
Blinder, who provided expert testimony about White’s depression and junk-food addiction, 
also appeared for the defense in People v. Berry, a California wife-killing case in which 
Blinder blamed the deceased’s suicidal tendencies for her strangulation at the hands of her 
jealous husband.  See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976). 
227 See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility 
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 851 (1977). 
228 See supra note 226 (discussing the legal fallout from successful diminished 
responsibility claim that Dan White raised in California in the 1980s).  
229 VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 242. 
230 REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE, supra note 171, at 283. 
231 The unavailability of a diminished responsibility claim in Victoria is even less likely 
to result in unfair punishment than it is in states that have inflexible punishment regimes.  
Because Victoria does not impose mandatory minimum sentences, judges may devise 
appropriate outcomes, including hospitalization, for individuals whose mental deficiencies 
arguably reduce their culpability.  VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 242. 
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ii.  Duress 
The VLRC also succeeded in convincing the Parliament of Victoria to 
adopt duress and necessity as defenses to murder and manslaughter in 
Victoria232—a move inconsistent with its general emphasis on eliminating 
partial excuses from the guilt phase.  Citing a South Australian case, Regina 
v. Runjanjic and Kontinnen, the Commission recommended allowing the 
jury to hear BWS evidence on a duress claim.233  It thus revealed its 
reluctance to abandon the language of excuse or cut ties with psychological 
interpretations.  Indeed, some Australian scholars associate Runjanjic and 
Kontinnen, the first case in which BWS was admitted in an Australian trial, 
with impoverished constructions of the theory that almost exclusively 
emphasize abnormal mental state at the expense of social context.234 
The duress test seems to have been conceived as an objective one, 
centered on a reasonable choice between evils, rather than as a sympathetic 
concession to irrationality.  BWS evidence presumably would go to the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s choice.235  Yet duress poses issues that 
are inherently more troubling than either perfect or excessive self-defense 
because it applies to the killing of innocent third parties.  It is not limited to 
sympathetic scenarios of battered women who failed to protect minor 
children from death or sexual abuse, but also extends to active crimes.  Its 
applicability to battered women’s cases in the absence of an imminence 
requirement thus means that defendants might claim duress as a defense to 
multiple crimes that occurred over years of ongoing domestic violence.236 
The VLRC never veered closer to “whatever works” pragmatism than 
it did in its willingness to excuse women who facilitate their batterers’ 
crimes and to allow BWS testimony to accomplish that end.237  The moral 
 
232 Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AG) (Duress) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).  The 
majority of American jurisdictions do not recognize the defense of duress in cases of 
criminal homicide.  See Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1488 (1999).  Only the Model Penal Code and a small 
number of jurisdictions permit this theory to excuse all crimes.  See id. at 1488 (citing 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1)).  While a full discussion of duress lies beyond the scope of 
this paper, which primarily focuses on the provocation doctrine, I would not favor a dramatic 
expansion of the duress defense in the United States. 
233 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 121, 123-24 (citing R. v. 
Runjanjic & Kontinnen (1991) 53 A. Crim. R. 362). 
234 See Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 722-23. 
235 See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 123. 
236 See Burke, supra note 18, at 311-13. 
237 Astoundingly, the VLRC also indicated support for the continued operation of the 
archaic marital coercion defense in Victoria.  See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra 
note 3, at 122.  Although it declined to make any formal recommendations as to this 
doctrine, which does not apply to murder in Victoria, it gratuitously opined: 
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gulf between killing a brutal abuser and victimizing a third party may 
simply be too wide to bridge.  Falling back on the BWS approach in its zeal 
to include every possible defense for battered women accused of criminal 
homicide, the Commission failed to adhere consistently to a moral stance. 
5.  Some Concluding Thoughts on Victoria’s Homicide Law Reforms 
Victoria’s homicide law reforms could have been reconciled in a 
manner that not only achieved substantive gender equality, but also 
consistently made moral judgments about a defendant’s acts and valuations 
that distinguished less wrongful homicides from more wrongful ones based 
on the defendant’s reasons for killing.  Victoria’s failure to steer the latter 
course without swerving leaves its reform package vulnerable to the 
criticism that it excuses women, while abolishing mitigation in the guilt 
phase for the types of homicides that men more often commit—in other 
words, that it turns the tables without achieving justice.  The changes to 
murder defenses in Victoria were carefully conceived and have much to 
recommend them.  However, they would have provided a more coherent 
agenda with broader applicability to other jurisdictions if they had 
uniformly demanded that murder defendants be treated as responsible moral 
agents in cases falling short of insanity. 
Taking a consistently evaluative approach would have made more 
visible the connection between Victoria’s reforms and the purposes of the 
criminal law.  For example, if a murder conviction sends the message that it 
is wrongful to deny your spouse the autonomous choice to leave the 
marriage, at least three goals can be served.  First, the condemnatory 
message itself fulfills the criminal law’s expressive function.  Second, 
consistent expression of moral condemnation may stigmatize this type of 
killing and thus have a deterrent effect on potential offenders who 
internalize the norm.  Lastly, the conviction sends a strong cue about desert.  
If we believe the sexual rage killer is more deserving of punishment than 
 
Retention of the defence [for other crimes] may be justified because of the high rate of violence 
by men against their partners and the difficulties which women experience in seeking effective 
protection against such violence.  The Commission acknowledges that some women who are 
subjected to psychological and physical abuse may be forced to commit crimes by their 
husbands, although we note that it is anomalous that the defence currently applies only to 
married women and not to women in de facto relationships. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Anne Coughlin has thoroughly documented how in the nineteenth-century United 
States, the marital coercion defense was associated with theories of married women’s total 
submission to their husbands’ will, as well as with their feeblemindedness.  See Coughlin, 
supra note 18, at 28-42.  The VLRC’s embrace of this defense hints at an instrumental desire 
to achieve the acquittal of battered women at any cost, even at the expense of stereotyping 
women as childlike and dysfunctional.  This is a troubling passage. 
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the defendant who honestly but unreasonably killed in self-defense, we 
must follow the courage of our convictions in treating sexual rage as an 
inappropriate valuation and acknowledging that fear caused by spousal 
battering is an 
appropriate one. 
IV.  MORAL JUDGMENT, PARTIAL DEFENSES TO MURDER, AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part considers whether Victoria’s reform package should be 
adopted in American states and concludes that several steps ought to be 
taken with regard to partial defenses.  First, statutory EMED defenses based 
on the Model Penal Code should be repealed.  The second step depends on 
the willingness of state legislatures to revise their sentencing regimes.  
Victoria's reforms exemplify the greater creativity that can be brought to 
improving substantive law when guided discretion is possible in sentencing.  
American sentencing law is currently in flux.  Some states have repealed 
mandatory minimums and lowered maximum penalties for certain crimes 
due to budgetary concerns and other factors.238  Enhanced ability to 
individualize sentences for murder would make possible the complete 
abolition of the common law provocation doctrine in the guilt phase.  By 
contrast, if American states retain their harsh sentencing structures, the 
common law provocation doctrine will have to be curtailed, rather than 
abolished completely.  Constraints on its availability could take the form of 
either refashioned categories of adequate provocation or categorical 
exclusions of certain types of defense claims, such as those based on a 
spouse’s infidelity, separation, or desire for a divorce.  This Part contends 
that, because it is difficult to anticipate every conceivable wrong that might 
lead a defendant to feel morally appropriate anger, it is preferable to list the 
things that cannot constitute the basis of a provocation claim.  Finally, 
widespread adoption of an imperfect self-defense doctrine without any 
requirement of an immediate threat would provide an important safety net 
for defendants who claim to have killed to protect themselves, but whom 
juries are unwilling to exonerate completely. 
A.  THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA: A COMPARISON OF THE 
MODERN SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
238 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1276, 1285-90 (2005). 
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Although American women may commit intimate-partner homicides 
more frequently than their Australian counterparts,239 recent data 
demonstrate that both fatal and non-fatal intimate-partner violence in the 
United States primarily involves female victims and male perpetrators.240  
According to U.S. Department of Justice surveys, American men are three 
times more likely than American women to kill their spouses or intimate 
partners.241  Moreover, women in the United States, as in Australia, usually 
commit intimate-partner homicides “after years of suffering physical 
violence, after they have exhausted all available sources of assistance, when 
they feel trapped, and because they fear for their own lives.”  In contrast, 
American “[m]en often hunt down and kill spouses who have left them.”242 
While some husband-killers are vilified at trial,243 modern American 
cases, like their historical counterparts,244 tell a complicated and somewhat 
surprising story.  According to a recent study, rage killers are more likely to 
be convicted of murder than to receive manslaughter mitigation, whereas 
prosecutors and juries tend to accept the EMED claims of defendants who 
assert that they committed homicide out of fear.245  Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the female defendants who have attracted the least sympathy 
from juries and the media engaged in conduct that resembled a separation 
assault by a jealous male.246  Such examples might suggest that calls to 
 
239 See Morgan, supra note 42, at 2 n.5 (citing Wilson & Daly, supra 166, at 190 (“In the 
United States, ‘the number of women who kill their husbands relative to the numbers of men 
who kill their wives . . . is exceptionally high.’”)). 
240 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE 1993-2001 (2003). 
241 Id. 
242 Wilson & Daly, supra note 166, at 206. 
243 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 14, at 49-50 (arguing that Betty Broderick, a Southern 
California woman who killed her ex-husband and his new wife, failed to fit the image of the 
Reasonable Woman because, after the divorce, she gained weight, stalked her former spouse, 
damaged his property, and left vulgar messages on his answering machine). 
244 See supra Part II. 
245 Stuart M. Kirschner, Thomas R. Litwack & Gary J. Galperin, The Defense of Extreme 
Emotional Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 102, 102, 127 (2004). 
246 One such case that produced a media frenzy involved the so-called “Mercedes 
Murderer,” Clara Harris, who ran over her adulterous husband three times with her luxury 
car while his teenaged daughter sat, horrified, in the front seat.  See Prosecution Witnesses 
Recall Wife Running Over Husband, CNN.COM, Feb. 12, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/11/harris.trial/; see also LEE, supra note 14, at 46-50 
(discussing the case of Betty Broderick, who committed a lethal separation assault on her 
former spouse and his new wife).  Both Broderick and Harris were convicted of murder.  See 
id. at 49 (noting that Broderick was convicted of second-degree murder); Nick Madigan, 
Jury Gives 20-Year Term in Murder of Husband, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at A15 
(reporting that a jury convicted Harris of first-degree murder). 
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abolish or amend the provocation doctrine and the EMED defense are 
premature and that the impact of these laws on men’s and women’s cases is 
not, in fact, unfair.  Conversely, they could be interpreted as a sign that 
some individual actors in the criminal justice system have a truer compass 
than does the current law—that is, they apply expansive doctrines narrowly 
with an eye to the moral difference between jealous rage and frustration, on 
the one hand, and fear of physical victimization, on the other. 
Some positive legal change has already occurred in the United States.  
As discussed below, a few American jurisdictions, most notably Maryland 
and Minnesota, have revised their laws to constrain the ability of domestic 
abusers and sexual rage killers to escape murder convictions.247  In addition 
to these changes, some states have laws that parallel specific aspects of 
Victoria’s reform package.  For example, a substantial minority of 
American jurisdictions allow imperfect self-defense claims to reduce 
murder to manslaughter in a manner similar to Victoria’s new defensive 
homicide provision.248  Feminists in the United States have also taken the 
lead in identifying less stigmatic means of explaining a battered woman’s 
constrained or non-existent choices than the BWS theory provides.249 
Nevertheless, the laws in some American states still make BWS 
evidence a necessary evil to get an imperfect self-defense theory, not to 
mention completely exculpatory claims, before a jury.250  Reforming 
defenses to murder thus constitutes a prerequisite to eschewing stereotypes 
of irrationality when representing battered women who killed their abusers, 
as well as to ridding homicide law of its morally erroneous excuses for 
men. 
B.  ABOLISHING THE EXTREME MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL 
DISTURBANCE APPROACH 
The repeal of EMED statutes is an important place to start.  The chief 
dangers of the Model Penal Code approach described earlier in this Article 
are its extreme individualization of the “reasonable person” test and its 
 
247 See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text. 
248 See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Reactive Cognition, Reactive Emotion: Toward a More 
Psychologically-Informed Understanding of Reactive Homicide, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 243, 259 (2008). 
249 Indeed, as early as 1996, a study undertaken under the federal Violence against 
Women Act, recommended a social-context approach.  It described the breadth of empirical 
knowledge about “battering and its effects” and discussed the limitations of the BWS theory.   
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE VALIDITY AND USE OF 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT 
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT vii, xii-xiii (1996). 
250 See, e.g., infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (discussing imperfect self-
defense doctrine in Maryland). 
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willingness to abandon or cloak moral assessments in favor of sympathy for 
a defendant’s purported volitional impairment.251  Defendants who claim 
EMED are not legally insane, and they do not argue that their disturbed 
emotions negated their intent to kill.  Theirs are intentional homicides that 
should result in verdicts expressing a high level of condemnation.  
Mitigation on the basis of fine psychological gradations that cannot be 
reliably determined risks providing a normatively undesirable excuse for 
the very defendants this Article contends should not be excused—stressed 
or depressed men driven to kill by rage at their inability to control 
women.252 
Although this Article primarily focuses on culpability, utilitarian 
concerns are also relevant.  Assuming for the sake of argument that an 
emotionally disturbed defendant cannot be specifically deterred due to a 
volitional impairment, denouncing his act as murder may prevent others 
from raising spurious psychological claims.  Furthermore, while the Model 
Penal Code approach seeks a halfway house for disturbed individuals who 
cannot obtain insanity acquittals, it does not ensure that their reduced prison 
sentences will be paired with any therapeutic regimen to help them manage 
their violent emotions upon release.  Thus, a variety of utilitarian concerns 
for society’s safety, including deterrence and incapacitation, can be paired 
with arguments about blameworthiness to advocate the repeal of the EMED 
defense. 
The Model Penal Code’s approach to manslaughter mitigation has had 
limited influence in the United States.  Relatively few states that adopted 
other Code provisions enacted the EMED defense, and “a substantial 
number of the ones that did reverted to the common law formulation after 
only a short time.”253  However, more than a dozen states currently have 
manslaughter laws that partly track Model Penal Code recommendations.254  
 
251 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
252 But see Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 301 (2003) (arguing that conditions like “great stress” should reduce 
culpability) [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Rationality].  Morse formerly opposed both 
heat-of-passion and partial responsibility defenses because he believed that even people with 
mental health problems could refrain from killing.  See generally Stephen J. Morse, 
Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984) 
[hereinafter Morse, Undiminished Confusion].  For further discussion of Morse’s opposition 
to the provocation defense, see Morse, Diminished Rationality, supra, at 290, and infra note 
269 and accompanying text. 
253 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 323. 
254 One prominent criminal law casebook asserts that five states “adopted the Model 
Penal Code provocation proposals almost whole (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, 
and New York)” and that “[a]bout a dozen other states adopted some of the Code’s features, 
usually the ‘extreme emotional disturbance’ formulation, but adopted it with significant 
alterations.”  KADISH ET AL., supra note 225, at 405.  In contrast, Lee contends that “at least 
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Others have judicially expanded versions of the common law provocation 
defense.  The empirical evidence that Victoria Nourse compiled clearly 
shows that, in reform jurisdictions, judges give more manslaughter 
instructions in separation-murder cases than in common law states.255  
Many of these killings arise, not from witnessed acts of adultery, but from 
the victim’s choice to leave her partner, file for divorce, get a restraining 
order, or decline a request for a date.  The law permits the defendant’s claim 
of control over a spouse, lover, or even the object of his unrequited sexual 
obsession to extend far beyond the termination of all social and legal 
connection.  During the period Nourse studied, men who stalked and killed 
women because they remarried, moved out, or simply declined to become 
romantically involved routinely succeeded in getting their emotional 
disturbance defenses before a jury.256  Heterosexual intimate partnerships 
are not the only gendered situations in which the EMED approach 
acknowledges intense emotions bordering on depravity as potential objects 
of a jury’s compassion.  For example, heterosexual men have asked juries 
to believe they acted under provocation or EMED when they killed gay 
men for making non-violent sexual overtures to them.257 
What the jury does with such claims may be a different matter.  
Although Nourse did not analyze verdicts, at least one study has shown that 
between 1988 and 1997 in New York County, a jurisdiction that follows the 
Model Penal Code approach, juries and prosecutors made distinctions 
favoring defendants who “killed or tried to kill in response to physical 
victimization or understandable fear [thereof]” at the hands of the deceased, 
but proved “unreceptive to claims of EED [the New York version of 
EMED] when the defendant’s prevailing emotion at the time of the crime 
was anger unmitigated by a reasonable . . . fear of physical harm.”258  Thus, 
contrary to some feminist predictions,259 increased jury discretion does not 
seem to have resulted in rampant sexism in verdicts mitigating murder to 
voluntary manslaughter.  The New York study’s authors conclude that the 
concerns of EED critics are “considerably exaggerated” and that, in fact, the 
 
twenty states have adopted the Model Penal Code approach to provocation” and provides a 
helpful list in a footnote.  LEE, supra note 14, at 33 & n.66. 
255 See Nourse, supra note 17, at 1347-50 & tbls.A & B. 
256 See id. at 1352-66. 
257 Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 500 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lee, Gay Panic]. 
258 Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 130. 
259 See, e.g., Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, 
Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 669 (2001) (expressing concern that 
the EMED doctrine will allow jurors to give voice to their own prejudices). 
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defense may be most compassionate toward battered women who kill their 
abusers.260 
Three objections to this conclusion must be noted, however.  First, the 
authors do not actually demonstrate that the defense works well for female 
defendants, as a very small number of subjects in their study were 
female.261  Second, the New York data does not allow meaningful analysis 
of “gay panic” claims, which have resulted in manslaughter mitigation in 
several cases.262  Third, “successful” outcomes for murder defendants, as 
measured by manslaughter verdicts and acquittals, tell only a partial story—
the story of the jury’s compassion for one type of defendant over another.  
They do not tell us that the law on the books is fair or expressive of 
appropriate judgments about which beliefs and actions reflect 
blameworthiness or dangerousness.  “[T]he decision to send the case to a 
jury itself has legal meaning,” as Nourse contends.263  When an EMED 
instruction communicates to a jury that anger over an intimate-partner’s 
departure reduces murder to manslaughter, “it partially, but clearly, 
punishes the act of leaving” the relationship.264  Thus, it sends a bad moral 
message, and it reduces deterrence, too, by showing leniency to rage killers 
whom little or no empirical evidence suggests are less likely to recidivate 
than others who commit homicide.265  Furthermore, even if some juries 
interpret the elements of EMED more narrowly than the instructions 
 
260 Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 126, 129.  I have found anecdotal evidence that 
defense lawyers sometimes advise male clients to plead guilty to murder in exchange for a 
reduced sentence, rather than to claim EMED, in separation assault cases and that these 
decisions have been held not to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because juries 
may be unlikely to accept EMED claims and may even recommend a death sentence on 
separation-assault facts.  See, e.g., Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective in pursuing a guilty plea, rather 
than raising an EMED defense, where the defendant shot his estranged wife in front of 
eyewitnesses after she ended their relationship and obtained an emergency protective order 
against him); Perez v. Warden, No. CV000597510, 2001 WL 1468643, at *8 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 2, 2001) (holding that defense counsel did not perform ineffectively by 
recommending that a physically abusive, alcoholic husband who killed his unfaithful wife 
enter a guilty plea, rather than proceeding to trial with an EMED claim). 
261 Only two cases involved female defendants, both of whom pled guilty to 
manslaughter without a jury determination of whether self-defense or any other claim might 
have exculpated them completely.  See Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 108. 
262 See Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 500; cf. NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 
171, at 11-12 (discussing Green, in which a man who killed in response to a non-violent 
homosexual advance was found guilty of manslaughter after the Australian High Court 
overturned his murder conviction). 
263 Nourse, supra note 17, at 1357. 
264 Id. at 1355, 1357. 
265 Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 31, at 965. 
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encourage,266 the potential for ambiguous and arbitrary application of the 
partial defense bolsters the case for its abolition. 
A few feminist scholars—most notably, Nourse and Donna Coker—
have mounted criticisms of expansive, modern approaches to loss of self-
control.267  Yet, for other feminists, the parallels between the longer time 
frames and psychiatric experts needed to show EMED and those used to 
raise self-defense claims based on BWS have led to a pragmatic reluctance 
to attack EMED too strenuously.  In the end, though, it is a mistake to 
concede any commonality between a man who slays his partner because he 
cannot control her sexuality (or her other non-violent behavior) and a 
woman who kills her husband because he threatens her with death.  
Legislatures ought to insist on a moral distinction between the two and 
repeal the EMED statutes.  As described below,268 widespread adoption of 
imperfect self-defense mitigation—or defensive homicide, as Victoria’s law 
now describes it—would provide a back-up option more appropriately 
tailored to self-protective killings than EMED. 
C.  THE FATE OF THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE 
1.  Is Abolition Feasible in the United States? 
A few American scholars have urged complete abolition of the heat-of-
passion defense, including its narrower common law incarnations.  For 
example, Stephen Morse makes the compelling argument that 
[r]easonable people do not kill no matter how much they are provoked, and even 
enraged people generally retain the capacity to control homicidal or any other kind of 
aggressive or antisocial desires.  We cheapen both life and our conception of 
responsibility by maintaining the provocation/passion mitigation . . . .  As virtually 
every human being knows because we all have been enraged, it is easy not to kill, 
even when one is enraged.269 
The abolition argument has also been made from a feminist perspective in 
the United States.  Emily Miller contends, for instance, that “[b]ecause what 
is reasonable cannot be determined without reference to value systems 
biased in favor of men, the only true egalitarian approach is abolition.”270  
But the abolitionist position has not gained ground in the United States the 
way it has in Australia.  Although Texas shifted consideration of “sudden 
 
266 See, e.g., People v. Ross, 826 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“[A]nger 
and jealousy do not entitle a defendant to an extreme emotional disturbance charge.”) 
267 See Coker, supra note 117, at 78, 82, 86-87, 91-92, 120; Nourse, supra note 17, at 
1337, 1352-58, 1365-66. 
268 See infra notes 317-33 and accompanying text. 
269 Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 252, at 33-34 (footnote omitted). 
270 Miller, supra note 259, at 693. 
2010] PROVOKING CHANGE 89 
heat of passion” from the guilt phase to the penalty phase, it did so without 
attacking the gendered impact of designating separation or infidelity as 
legally provoking.271  Moreover, no ripple effect ensued from the Texas 
reform. 
The drastic reduction of judicial authority over criminal sentencing in 
the 1980s and 1990s partially accounts for the abolition argument’s lack of 
success in the United States.  During this time period, mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws, life-without-parole penalties, repeat offender provisions, 
and strict guidelines regimes proliferated at the state level, and the majority 
of states abolished or limited parole.272  Eliminating a mitigating doctrine 
like the heat-of-passion defense in this environment would have subjected a 
larger class of murder defendants to draconian and virtually automatic 
penalties.  Recently, the innocence movement, budgetary concerns, and 
other factors have created a climate more favorable to sentencing reform.  
Both the number of executions and support for the death penalty have 
declined, and more than half of American states have taken strides to make 
sentencing less harsh and more individualized.273  The time thus may be 
ripe for a comprehensive overhaul of our approach to murder cases that 
includes the reform of defenses, as well as changes to the way we sentence 
and punish those convicted of murder or manslaughter. 
Yet, unlike Victoria and Tasmania, which can defer consideration of 
provocation arguments to a flexible sentencing phase, many jurisdictions, 
including Britain and some Australian and American states, still allow 
minimal discretion in sentencing.274  In Western Australia, the provocation 
defense was abolished even though the presumptive penalty for murder was 
life imprisonment.  However, Western Australia paired reform of the 
substantive law with at least one change in its sentencing regime; it now 
allows a penalty reduction for circumstances in which a life term would be 
unjust.275  By contrast, in jurisdictions where discretionary leniency in 
sentencing is proscribed, a murder verdict dictates much more than the 
stigma of conviction. 
 
271 See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative change in 
Texas). 
272 See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make 
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 360-61 (2009). 
273 See id. at 369-70 & n.199; Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 223, 267 n.214 (2007). 
274 Jeremy Horder qualified his call for abolition in Britain with the caveat that such a 
move would only be possible “should the mandatory life sentence for murder ever be 
abolished.”  HORDER, supra note 35, at 197. See also Forell, supra note 38, at 43 (discussing 
the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing on the reform of murder defenses). 
275 CRIM. CODE 1913 (W. Austl.), § 279(4). 
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Some commentators might not find this harsh result troubling, 
especially in cases of defendants whose homicidal acts arose from sexual 
jealousy.  Indeed, the SAC report in Victoria recommended excluding such 
claims from mitigation at sentencing.276  But the provocation doctrine has 
never been solely about adultery or the termination of intimate 
relationships.  Rather, the partial defense traditionally embodied other 
claims besides the iconic allegation of victim infidelity—including claims 
based on the accused witnessing the deceased assault a family member or 
experiencing a violent attack by the deceased himself.277  While anecdotal 
evidence yields glimpses of popular outrage over lenient sentences for men 
who slew their adulterous wives,278 totally abolishing the provocation 
doctrine in the United States, without concurrent changes to our draconian 
sentencing structure, would deprive other provoked defendants of a chance 
for mitigation.279 
For these and other reasons, American scholars have largely confined 
themselves to modifying the “reasonable person” test280 or to discussing 
how a jury should be instructed to counter potential prejudices.281  We need 
 
276 See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discussing the SAC report’s 
recommendations). 
277 See, e.g., Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991) (describing the traditional 
common law categories of legally adequate provocation). 
278 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 346. 
279 See Forell, supra note 38, at 43. 
280 For instance, Caroline Forell and Donna Matthews propose a “reasonable woman” 
standard that would result in the categorical exclusion of any alleged provocation “short of 
actual or imminent serious bodily harm.”  FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 14, at 172.  This 
creative proposal can be faulted for assuming all women see reasonableness the same way.  
Although I accept empirical evidence that women most often kill in self-defense, whereas 
men kill out of a desire to exert control, my argument does not ultimately depend on 
essentialist generalizations about women’s emotions or beliefs.  It is more useful to describe 
the moral content the law should embody and the norms it should announce than to 
characterize these aspirations as masculine or feminine.  My approach celebrates and 
reinforces changes in societal attitudes, such as emerging intolerance for sexual rage killings, 
without suggesting that the only “good guys” are the ones who think like women.  Homicide 
law should respect non-violent acts of autonomy in an intimate relationship, rather than 
display empathy for one partner’s brutal desire to dominate the other; it should express 
compassion and even approval for defensive conduct in response to physical victimization.  
In short, I agree with much that Forell and Matthews advocate, including their claims that 
“reasonable women want and demand respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily 
integrity” and that behavior violating these aspects of humanity should be illegal and 
punishable.  Id. at xix.  However, in the final analysis, I believe the “reasonable woman” 
standard is marred by its tendency to stereotype and essentialize female experience. 
281 For example, Cynthia Lee advocates jury instructions that insert a proportionality 
requirement by explaining that the defendant’s act, as well as his emotion, must be 
normatively reasonable.  LEE, supra note 14, at 268.  She also proposes helping jurors 
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to go farther than this to correct the unequal and morally mistaken impact of 
the expansive modern provocation defense.  Ideally, this Article will spark a 
conversation about the need for comprehensive reform of both substantive 
law and sentencing in murder cases.  Yet, because American sentencing 
regimes are now in flux, it offers a proposal that will work even if 
mandatory minimums and other constraints remain on the books in some 
states. 
2.  Refashioning the Categories of Adequate (or Inadequate) Provocation 
Alternatives to abolishing the heat-of-passion doctrine include the 
retention of the reasonable person standard paired with either the reform of 
the traditional common law categories of adequate provocation or the 
preclusion as a matter of law of certain types of claims.  This Article favors 
the latter. 
i.  Newfangled Categories 
Refashioning the categories of adequate provocation might mean a 
return to the nineteenth-century five—extreme assault and battery upon the 
defendant, mutual combat, the defendant’s illegal arrest, and injury or 
serious abuse of a close relative—minus the sudden discovery of a spouse’s 
adultery.282  Alternatively, it might necessitate envisioning entirely new 
types of victim behavior that could conceivably spark legitimate feelings of 
anger or fear.  Whichever categories one chooses, though, this approach has 
the same flaw that prompted the Model Penal Code reforms—namely, its 
inflexibility.  The EMED defense can be faulted for replacing righteous 
rage with pathology and rigid categories with the potential for nearly 
boundless excuses.  Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code’s drafters had a 
valid point about rigidity.  Eschewing the Code’s focus on loss of self-
control in favor of moral evaluation provides no method of foreseeing every 
wrong that could lead a defendant to feel morally appropriate rage or fear.  
A reductive list of provoking conduct thus constrains the provocation 
doctrine without offering much assurance that the chosen categories are 
either principled or sufficiently inclusive. 
ii.  Categorical Exclusions 
Several American states have instead opted for categorical exclusions, 
which I believe to be a superior approach.  For instance, Maryland’s 
 
recognize their own biases by asking them to switch certain attributes of the victim and 
defendant, including their sex and race.  Id. at 252-53. 
282 See, e.g., Girouard, 583 A.2d at 718 (describing traditional limits to legally adequate 
provocation). 
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criminal code now provides that “the discovery of one’s spouse engaged in 
sexual intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate 
provocation for the purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of murder 
to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked by that 
discovery.”283  Minnesota bars a defendant from claiming that a child crying 
constitutes provocation.284  In a similar vein, several commentators have 
urged legislatures to enact laws, or judges to make rulings, that exclude 
“gay panic” defenses from manslaughter mitigation.285 
The existence of mandatory life terms and other constraints on 
sentencing discretion in some states makes it unfeasible to condemn all 
provoked killings as murder in these jurisdictions but still allow for some 
individualization in punishment.  Hence, this Article proposes a solution 
that will work with or without sentencing reform.  Instead of abolishing the 
heat-of-passion defense, American states should statutorily exclude 
narrowly drawn classes of victim behavior from legally adequate 
provocation on the grounds that killing in these contexts can never be 
partially justified.286  My goal is not to draft a model statute, but simply to 
propose that killings based on antiquated social values and those that deny 
equality between people should be ineligible for manslaughter mitigation. 
Although this Article leaves the details of a legislative solution to the 
states, categorical exclusions from the standard of legally adequate 
provocation might encompass such behavior as: 
 
283 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (LexisNexis 2002). 
284 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West 2009). 
285 See, e.g., Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes 
Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 662 (2001) (“[S]tate 
legislatures should move to explicitly and statutorily prohibit the homosexual-advance 
defense as a part of their hate crimes legislation.”); Robert B. Mison, Comment, 
Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 133, 176-77 (1992) (“[W]hen a defendant raises the homosexual-advance 
defense, judges should consider the growing normative acceptance and understanding of 
homosexuality . . . and find as a matter of law that a homosexual advance is insufficient 
provocation.”).  For examples of proposed and enacted legislative preclusions in Australia, 
see infra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to the provocation 
defense in the Australian Capital Territory) and NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 171, at 16 
(noting that, in 1998, the exclusion of non-violent homosexual advances from the law of 
provocation was recommended in New South Wales).  But see Joshua Dressler, When 
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual 
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 763 
(1995) (“[I]f critics wish to attack the provocation defense, they should do it from a feminist, 
not a sexual orientation, perspective.”). 
286 For further discussion of the provocation defense as a partial justification, see infra 
Part IV.C.3. 
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(1) a decision by the victim to terminate or decline to begin a romantic 
or sexual relationship with the defendant or to have sex with another 
person; 
(2) a non-violent homosexual advance by the victim toward the 
defendant; 
(3) any behavior by a child, except for an aggressive act that posed a 
risk of death or serious bodily injury to the defendant or another; 
(4) and mere words. 
Precluding these types of defense claims would constrain the provocation 
doctrine within bounds sufficiently flexible to accommodate jury 
consideration of many individual cases, while still exempting from 
mitigation lethal acts arising from indefensible judgments about the 
victim’s autonomy, freedom to speak, or youthful misconduct. 
Scholars and legislators will likely quibble with these suggested 
preclusions.  For example, some might find the infidelity-or-separation 
exclusion unpalatable, despite the commonplace nature of adultery and 
divorce in American society.  Marriages consecrated in religious settings 
are viewed as sacred; even secular unions often involve vows of fidelity and 
permanence.  However, being angry or distraught over the disintegration of 
a marriage is not the same as violently denying your spouse’s autonomy to 
make a choice, even a hurtful choice.  The criminal law has no proper role 
in assigning fault for divorce, separation, or adultery—especially given 
potential ambiguity about whether a spouse wrongfully breached her vows 
or whether she was driven into another relationship to escape a cruel and 
violent marriage.  The criminal law should not use its expressive power to 
say that the emotions and actions of dominance in an intimate relationship 
make the perpetrator of a lethal separation assault less culpable than a 
murderer.287 
Barring provocation claims arising from infidelity and separation—
scenarios in which men disproportionately use lethal violence to control and 
punish their spouses—is necessary if categorical exclusions are to be 
guided by equality principles.  A similar approach has been adopted in 
Maryland288 and most recently in Britain.289  It has also been proposed in 
 
287 Mahoney, supra note 1, at 65 (defining a “separation assault” as  an “attack on the 
woman’s body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate 
for separation, or force her to return.  It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with 
whom she will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship.”). 
288 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.  
289 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 that recently became law in the United Kingdom 
asserts that sexual infidelity cannot constitute the sole basis for feeling “seriously wronged” 
for the purposes of a partial defense of “loss of control.”  See Coroners and Justice Act, 
2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 55(6)(c).  While this change was under consideration as a bill, 
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Queensland, Australia, where a law reform commission recommended 
barring provocation claims based on “the deceased’s exercise of choice 
about a[n] [intimate] relationship” except in “circumstances of an extreme 
and exceptional character.”290 
The “mere words” exclusion is perhaps the hardest to reconcile with 
substantive equality theory.  Indeed, reformers in Victoria indicated that a 
racial slur might be sufficiently wrongful to constitute legal provocation for 
sentencing purposes.291  However, they made this determination in the 
context of provocation’s total elimination as a mitigating doctrine in the 
guilt phase.  A killer who acts on the basis of a racial slur is still deemed a 
murderer in Victoria.  By contrast, if the heat-of-passion defense is retained 
as an avenue to manslaughter mitigation, I would favor categorically 
excluding claims of purely verbal provocation, even if based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, unless the allegedly 
provoking words constituted a threat or were paired with a physical assault.  
In “mere words” cases, the equality-denying potential of speech bumps up 
against another concern that should inform legislative exclusions—that of 
freeing the provocation doctrine from the troubling implications of using 
violence to defend honor.292  Words can enforce the subordination of certain 
groups and show deplorable prejudice, but the violent, private policing of 
hate speech should not be condoned, lest we adopt the pernicious methods 
of nineteenth-century honor culture to attack the hierarchical inequities that 
honor culture perpetuated. 293 
 
the British government stated that, in a mixed-motive case, “where sexual infidelity is one 
part in a set of circumstances which led to the defendant losing control, the defense should 
succeed or fail on the basis of those circumstances disregarding the element of sexual 
infidelity.”  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM OF THE LAW (SUMMARY OF RESPONSES AND GOVERNMENT POSITION) (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
consultations/docs/murder-review-response.pdf.  For more information on reforms in the 
United Kingdom, see infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text. 
290 For the recommendation of the Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC), see 
QLRC, A REVIEW, supra note 172, at 481.  The QLRC proposal seems to give the judge, not 
the legislature, gate-keeping responsibility, however. 
291 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
292 In the nineteenth century, provocation claims were not only available to men who 
caught their wives in the act of adultery (a classic transgression of honor), but also, as the 
doctrine expanded in some jurisdictions, to killers provoked solely by verbal insults.  See 
supra note 57 and accompanying text.  Perhaps more surprisingly, women could defend their 
honor by slaying men who jilted them, and when they did so, they often received total 
exculpation, rather than being convicted of manslaughter.  See supra note 82 and 
accompanying text. 
293 See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) 
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES (forthcoming 2009) (describing 
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iii.  Responding to Criticisms of the “Categorical Exclusion” Model 
Even the basic concept of categorical exclusions is not without its 
flaws.  Legislative choices about what cannot meet the standard as a matter 
of law arguably still confront the task of imagining “the myriad ways in 
which an encounter preceding an allegedly provoked killing may take 
place.”294  Since a legislature must work on the basis of hypothetical 
examples, its ex ante determinations may not fit the facts of actual cases.  
Hence, some commentators oppose giving the legislature line-drawing 
authority in this area.295  Statutory exceptions to the provocation defense 
need not be sweeping, however.  For instance, an exception that bars 
provocation claims based solely on an intimate partner’s infidelity or 
decision to terminate a relationship with the defendant, seek a divorce, or 
obtain a restraining order would not preclude a killer’s partial defense to 
murdering his adulterous wife if she had also physically abused their 
children. 
An actual homicide for which manslaughter mitigation was extended 
further demonstrates the “categorical exclusion” model’s ability to account 
for case-specific facts.  In this deadly incident, the male defendant, whom a 
camp counselor had repeatedly sodomized when he was a child, killed a 
man who made sexual advances toward in him in a park.296  A legislative 
ban on provocation claims arising from non-violent homosexual overtures 
would not have prevented this killer from raising a mitigating argument 
because he also claimed “he thought that he saw the victim reach into his 
pocket for a weapon.”297  Such a narrow preclusion of gay panic claims 
would harmonize with the approach taken in several Australian 
jurisdictions, including the Australian Capital Territory, whose amended 
law provides that “a non-violent sexual advance . . . toward the accused is 
not sufficient, by itself” to reduce murder to manslaughter.298 
A second objection to the “categorical exclusion” model centers on a 
preference for juries.  For example, Cynthia Lee disfavors both legislative 
restrictions and decisions by a potentially prejudiced judge affecting which 
provocation issues reach the jury.299  Her criticism of legislative solutions 
 
how the violent honor culture of the nineteenth-century South was used to subordinate 
blacks and others who insulted white men). 
294 Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 550. 
295 See, e.g., id. 
296 Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 118. 
297 Id. 
298 NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 171, at 23 (citing Crimes Act, 1900 (ACT), § 13, as 
amended by the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act, 2004 (ACT)) 
(emphasis added). 
299 Id. 
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presumes that juries are freer from bias than legislatures are because 
constitutionally mandated rules of jury composition ensure broad 
community representation and because most juries operate unanimously, 
rather than following a majority vote.300  I respectfully disagree with her 
analysis here.  This Article occasionally cites jury verdicts as indicators of 
prevalent social values; yet it does not view jury behavior in murder cases 
as a transparent window on what types of homicides the law should or 
should not punish and with what degree of severity.  While the law should 
track communal values sufficiently to maintain legitimacy, it should also 
play a leadership role in shaping social norms and educating the public 
about what is morally wrongful.  Legislatures and judges (and to a certain 
extent, legal academics) take responsibility for this educative aspect of 
lawmaking.  Although the latter two display the most pretensions to 
enlightenment, it is the former—the legislature—that has the greater 
potential to counter minoritarian bias.  Moreover, while a jury’s decision to 
accept or reject a particular version of the provocation defense may have an 
irreparable and largely invisible impact in individual cases, legislative 
enactments are not only highly public; they can also be repealed. 
Multicultural concerns constitute a third possible objection to the 
“categorical exclusion” model.  In Victoria and Tasmania, cultural 
background is now taken into account in determining punishment, rather 
than guilt, in murder cases.  This shift in authority from jury to judge has 
not been universally applauded because it shunts the discussion of what is 
considered provoking in the defendant’s culture to a less visible and less 
democratic forum.301  In American states, my proposed legislative 
exclusions might clash with some cultural practices even though they would 
be established democratically.  For example, immigrant and aboriginal 
defendants sometimes proffer evidence that, due to their beliefs and 
customs, they could not restrain themselves from committing homicide 
upon learning of a spouse’s adultery or even her intent to seek a divorce.302  
A statutory bar to provocation mitigation in cases of infidelity or separation 
arguably would discriminate against the cultural values of these minorities. 
The tension between acknowledging cultural difference and 
appropriately condemning violence against women troubles many 
feminists, including myself.303  Yet, from a formal equality perspective, 
concerns about the unequal treatment of minority defendants would be 
 
300 See Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 553-54. 
301 See, e.g., Bronitt, supra note 113, at 126 (raising such concerns).  
302 See LEE, supra note 14, at 113-17. 
303 See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and 
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
36, 38-39 (1995) (noting that this tension has produced debate). 
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lessened if neither minorities nor members of the dominant culture could 
raise a provocation defense based on infidelity or separation.  Even under 
the substantive equality approach this Article advocates, neither the white 
nor the minority defendant should be allowed to shelter under an 
anachronistic and sexist category.  Whether the judgment that a wife’s 
transgression excused her murder derives from a dominant or minority 
claim, it erroneously assumes a static value system unchanged by women’s 
international bid for equality over the last century.  Euro-Americans and 
Euro-Australians have grown more accepting of a wife’s right to leave a 
marital relationship.  Patriarchal beliefs have also become outmoded or at 
least subject to challenge in the homelands of many immigrant and 
indigenous defendants of color.304  In short, cultural defense theories should 
not be allowed to bolster residual misogyny in the face of progressive social 
change. 
A fourth anticipated criticism of the “categorical exclusion” approach 
is the practical concern that, if the exclusions do not track areas of virtual 
unanimity in social values, jury nullification will result.  Legislatures that 
fail to pair reform of the partial defense with changes in harsh sentencing 
laws might encounter a variation on the “sticky norms” problem.305  Despite 
the relatively progressive social values revealed by studies of jury verdicts, 
residual beliefs that adultery, for example, sometimes warrants a violent 
response might lead to acquittal by fact-finders or even down-charging by 
prosecutors reluctant to leave defendants with no avenue to mercy.  
Categorical exclusions thus might backfire by forcing juries to acquit the 
very defendants whom many feminists believe should be labeled as 
murderers. 
This is a salient criticism and one that is not easy to answer.  However, 
when legislatures have reformed the provocation doctrine in the recent past, 
such changes have been responsive to public criticism of leniency toward 
defendants perceived to lack any valid justification for killing their victims.  
For example, furor over the 1994 case of Keith Peacock, who received a 
sentence of just eighteen months in a work-release program for shooting his 
unfaithful wife, prompted Maryland’s legislative exclusion of adultery from 
 
304 See LEE, supra note 14, at 103, 105.  By contrast, if a fact situation were not governed 
by a categorical exclusion (if it were a killing in response to extreme assault and battery, for 
example), cultural evidence could be admissible at the judge’s discretion. 
305 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (“[A sticky norms] problem occurs when the prevalence 
of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that 
norm.”).  In contrast, according to Kahan, “[w]hen the law embodies a relatively mild degree 
of condemnation, the desire of most decisionmakers to discharge their civic duties will 
override their reluctance to enforce a law that attacks a widespread social norm.”  Id. 
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the concept of legally adequate provocation.306  And, as this Article 
described above,307 the enactment of Victoria’s reform package coincided 
with widespread disapproval of mitigation in the Ramage case.  
Legislatures should not redraft defenses to murder every time citizens 
become incensed over news coverage of a criminal case; however, if public 
preferences harmonize with legislative changes, such changes are less likely 
to be nullified in the jury room. 
3.  Provocation as Partial Justification 
Constrained within newly tightened boundaries, a provocation claim 
should operate as a partial justification.  The approach suggested in this 
Article does not assert that the killing itself was justified, but rather that it 
was prompted by a legitimate, morally defensible valuation that comported 
with evolving social norms and substantive equality principles.  If the 
reintroduction of justifiable emotion is combined with a cooling-time limit 
and a required loss of self-control, the reformed doctrine might arguably be 
described as a hybrid that retains an element of excuse: the defendant’s 
sudden emotion, although justified, overpowered his ability to desist from 
an unlawful killing.  Deliberate revenge should not be tolerated, and 
lawmakers may wish to require a “hot blood” element to exclude such cases 
from manslaughter mitigation.  Nevertheless, the emphasis should fall on 
whether the defendant’s emotions and beliefs can be justified, not primarily 
on his alleged loss of self-control. 
Bringing back justification reverses the widely accepted, modern 
understanding of the provocation doctrine by reasserting a normative 
component; yet it has some advocates, including reformist lawmakers in the 
United Kingdom.  The British Parliament recently enacted a law308 that 
abolishes the common law provocation doctrine and adopts and clarifies the 
British Law Commission’s 2004 recommendation of a hybrid defense 
emphasizing the defendant’s “justifiable sense of being seriously wronged,” 
as well as allowing for mitigation when the accused acted “in response to a 
fear of serious violence.”309  Scholars criticized the British Law 
Commission for failing to consider gender asymmetries and for leaving the 
 
306 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 346 (discussing the impact of the Peacock case).  
For a discussion of the legislative change in Maryland excluding infidelity from legally 
adequate provocation, see supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.  
308 Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 54-56. 
309 Graeme Coss, Provocative Reforms: A Comparative Critique, 30 CRIM. L.J. 138, 139 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
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door open to trivially provoked men.310  Responding to such concerns, the 
Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 contains a provision establishing the 
insufficiency of sexual infidelity as a basis for feeling “seriously wronged.”  
Under the reformed law, infidelity is not to be construed as a qualifying 
trigger.311  Unfortunately, the Coroners and Justice Act retains the 
possibility that mere words—things “done or said (or both)”—might rise to 
that level.312  Despite their shortcomings, however, the British reforms 
wisely seek to make the provocation defense unavailable to individuals 
whose outrage is idiosyncratic and morally indefensible under 
contemporary standards. 
American legal scholar Susan Rozelle recently offered another 
perspective on provocation-as-partial-justification.  She argues that the 
doctrine should be applied narrowly to cases where the law supports some 
level of violent response to the victim’s conduct.  Her proposal differs from 
imperfect self-defense in that it covers situations in which the accused had a 
lawful right to employ some level of force, regardless of whether he 
sincerely feared death or serious harm from the victim.  The fact that the 
force used was excessive makes her proposal a partial defense.313 
Rozelle and I agree that the provocation doctrine retained remnants of 
justification long after the tide toward excusing passion killers swept away 
the official honor-killing rationale.  Indeed, as she notes, even the Model 
Penal Code’s quasi-objective prong reveals a minimal concern not to extend 
mitigation to defendants whose beliefs and emotions lie beyond what 
society is capable of understanding.314  Yet, while I agree with some of 
Rozelle’s premises, she and I part company in our approach to reform.  She 
 
310 See id. at 139-43 (complaining that the British Law Commission indicated “there may 
be cases” in which mere words “could legitimately make the other party feel severely 
wronged”); Howe, supra note 63, at 55-56 (criticizing the British Law Commission 
proposals for finding that sexual taunts might constitute adequate provocation). 
311 Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 55(6)(c). The act also applies 
“if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D 
or another person.”  Id. § 55(3). 
312 Id. § 55(4) (emphasis added). 
313 Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 197, 229-33 (2005).  Rozelle’s proposal is in many respects superior to 
Nourse’s warranted excuse, which restricts voluntary manslaughter mitigation to cases in 
which the deceased behaved in an illegal manner, see Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra 
note 17, at 1390-93, but fails to recognize that adultery remains a criminal offense under 
some state codes.  See Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 31, at 981. 
314 Rozelle, supra note 313, at 209.  However, I disagree with Rozelle’s contention that 
the EMED defense requires society to agree that “the defendant somehow was wronged or 
aggrieved.”  Id.  Code-influenced statutes typically contain no elements related to provoking 
conduct or triggering events; the touchstone is mental trauma, not justifiable rage.  See, e.g., 
State v. Elliot, 411 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1979). 
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merely redefines the boundaries of the old common law categories.  In 
contrast, I believe it would be preferable to create a few exceptions to the 
provocation doctrine for completely unjustifiable valuations, as lawmakers 
in the United Kingdom and some American states have done, than to return 
to a narrow typology of qualifying behavior.  The end result might look 
fairly similar, based on a shared assumption that legal provocation generally 
should involve physical harm.  However, unlike Rozelle’s,315 my proposal 
does not completely negate the possibility that some nonphysical injury 
might qualify. 
D.  IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE 
One of the chief contributions of the reforms in Victoria and Western 
Australia was the insight that homicide defenses ought to be revamped in a 
comprehensive manner—the reform package, rather than the surgical strike.  
In this spirit, American reformers should not abolish the EMED approach 
or radically limit the provocation doctrine without addressing the need for 
changes in perfect and imperfect self-defense.  I generally support the 
rational actor model of perfect self-defense that Alafair Burke has proposed, 
the two key components of which are the repudiation of the imminence 
requirement and the criticism of BWS evidence.316  Because this Article 
focuses on mitigation, rather than exculpation, however, I will turn to the 
topic of imperfect self-defense with the caveat that reforms in these related 
areas should be undertaken together. 
If American states retain the heat-of-passion defense in a form that 
includes fear as well as rage, one might question why the widespread 
adoption of imperfect self-defense should be necessary.  The answer is that 
the two partial defenses are distinct; they serve different purposes and 
involve different levels of objective analysis.  The provocation doctrine 
requires heightened emotion—a rubric that today includes fear and terror, 
as well as rage, in most jurisdictions.  Yet, whereas fear might arise from 
some non-lethal provocations, a defendant claiming imperfect self-defense 
must have believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection or 
the protection of others in the face of mortal danger.317  Furthermore, unlike 
the passion killer, a defendant who receives mitigation under an imperfect 
self-defense theory should not be required to have killed immediately after 
 
315 Rozelle tends to conflate imperfect self-defense and provocation by arguing that “act 
justification” would only exist under her revised provocation doctrine if the facts fit the 
imperfect self-defense paradigm.  Rozelle, supra note 313, at 229. 
316 See Burke, supra note 18, at 218-19. 
317 Cf. Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (making a similar 
distinction). 
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being harmed or threatened.  In other words, the latter theory should not 
have a cooling-time limitation. 
Although a substantial minority of American states currently recognize 
imperfect self-defense, the majority do not.318  As the Supreme Court of 
Washington explained, “[n]arrow statutory definitions of manslaughter 
have made adoption of imperfect self-defense difficult in some states.”319  
In states that already recognize the mitigating doctrine, three versions exist.  
The first applies to defendants who initiated a confrontation by using non-
lethal violence.  The second version, which is similar to Western Australia’s 
new law, covers individuals who use excessive force against an aggressor.  
Finally, like the Parliament of Victoria, some American legislatures and 
courts have acknowledged the partial defense in cases where the accused 
honestly but unreasonably believed that the victim posed a threat of death 
or serious bodily injury.320  Several American states that adopted the first 
two variations insist that the defendant’s belief in the necessity of using 
force to defend herself must have been both honest and reasonable.321 
Finally, some courts impose additional limits that affect battered 
women’s defense cases.  For example, in Maryland, imperfect self-defense 
claims without supporting BWS evidence are ineligible for manslaughter 
mitigation when the facts involve a non-confrontational killing.322  In State 
v. Peterson, the appellate court described a trial judge’s decision not to give 
an imperfect self-defense instruction as “correct” in a case involving a 
woman who “endured twenty-seven years of extreme physical and 
 
318 See Fontaine, supra note 248, at  259; see also State v. Hughes, 721 P.2d 902, 910 
(Wash. 1986) (declining to adopt imperfect self-defense in Washington); Note, Battered by 
Men, Bruised by Injustice: The Plight of Women Who Fight Back and the Need for a 
Battered Women Defense in West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1139, 1186-87 n.298 (2008) 
(noting the lack of an imperfect self-defense doctrine in West Virginia). 
319 Hughes, 721 P.2d at 909.  If the manslaughter statute restricts the actor’s mental state 
to recklessness or criminal negligence, an intentional homicide committed in a flawed effort 
to save oneself cannot qualify.  Id.  Legislative changes to manslaughter definitions thus 
constitute a prerequisite to the adoption of imperfect self-defense in such jurisdictions. 
320 See State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 763 (Md. 1984).  For a discussion of Victoria’s 
adoption of a defensive homicide provision, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
321 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 285 S.E.2d 804, 807-08 (N.C. 1982) (quoting State v. 
Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (N.C. 1981)); State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019, 1029 (Utah 2002).  
Wisconsin imposes a three-part test that allows the defendant’s conviction for imperfect self-
defense manslaughter “if the jury finds: (1) the defendant had a reasonable belief that he was 
preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person; AND (2) the defendant 
had an actual, but unreasonable belief that force was necessary to prevent or terminate the 
unlawful interference; OR (3) the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary 
to prevent or terminate the unlawful interference but the defendant’s actual belief regarding 
the amount of force necessary was unreasonable.”  State v. Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 383 
(Wis. 1993). 
322 State v. Peterson, 857 A.3d 1132, 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
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psychological abuse” by her husband and then shot him while he watched 
television.323  Despite Maryland’s adoption of the “honest but unreasonable 
belief” approach,324 imminence and necessity still seem to be required.  The 
defendant’s unreasonableness may inhere only in the excessiveness of the 
force used: “[T]he imperfect self-defense instruction should not be given 
unless the evidence generates the issue of whether, under the circumstances, 
the defendant was entitled to take some action against the victim.”325  
Barbara Peterson, who was sentenced to life in prison for murder, obtained 
postconviction relief only because the court deemed her attorney’s failure to 
present expert testimony on BWS “ineffective assistance of counsel” in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.326 
Peterson is the kind of case that battered women’s advocates cite to 
show the continuing need for syndrome evidence;327 yet the real problem 
lies in the retention of the imminence requirement.  While the imminence 
requirement may distort the analysis of perfect self-defense, it surely has no 
place when the outcome sought is only mitigation, not exoneration.  Critics 
of the “reasonable belief” approach to imperfect self-defense argue that the 
culpability of a defendant who sincerely thought she faced a threat of 
inevitable death or serious harm from the man she shot cannot be equated 
with the culpability of “one who intentionally murders another without such 
 
323 Id. at 1145, 1154.  This proceeding involved the state’s unsuccessful appeal of a new 
trial order based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 1135. 
324 Faulkner, 483 A.2d at 768-69. 
325 Peterson v. State, 643 A.2d 520, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).  Barbara Ann 
Peterson subsequently was granted a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
this statement of Maryland law remains undisturbed. 
326 Peterson, 857 A.2d at 1154. 
327 The Maryland courts’ insistence on BWS evidence to show the honesty of a 
defendant’s belief rejected the power of past-abuse facts to tell the story unaided by 
testimony on “learned helplessness”—a form of post-traumatic stress disorder that may 
poorly fit the defendant’s situation.  To bolster the unsuccessful insanity claim that was 
actually raised at Barbara Ann Peterson’s trial, a psychiatrist testified that Barbara suffered 
bi-polar and dissociative disorders.  The judges demanded a BWS theory to support her 
imperfect self-defense argument, and nowhere in any of the opinions was an image of the 
defendant as a rational moral actor allowed to emerge.  Barbara Ann Peterson may have had 
mental problems; her children described her as a “moody and mercurial” religious fanatic 
who claimed to see ghosts and experience extra-sensory perception.  Id. at 1138 (quoting the 
defense psychiatrist’s testimony about statements the defendant’s children had made).  But 
like many other battered women, she had temporarily left her marital home and sought court 
protection from her husband’s brutality so many times that one judge told her not to come 
back for a year.  Id.  In her mind, she had reached the end of her options.  Yet, the courts’ 
focus on her supposed psychosis deflected attention from the ills that most demand a cure—
the failure to prevent intimate-partner homicide by providing a social and legal safety net for 
battered women and the continued existence of homicide doctrines that apportion blame and 
excuse in undesirable ways. 
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a belief . . . .  [T]here is or . . . there ought to be, a difference in punishment 
between these two types of people.”328  This statement is generally sound, 
but we must refine which aspects of the defendant’s belief can be 
unreasonable.  If the defendant reasonably feared her violent husband, but 
was wrong about when he would attack or with how much brutality, she 
should get an imperfect self-defense instruction.  There, her beliefs and 
emotions contained a modicum of reasonableness, even if her lethal act did 
not.  Contra Peterson, I believe that this showing could be made through the 
lens of social framework and past-abuse evidence without the need for a 
psychological expert.  However, if the defendant’s fear was completely 
delusional, and she could not present any evidence that her husband had 
ever inflicted serious physical harm on her or threatened her with such 
injury, she should not get the instruction.  The latter type of claim sounds 
closer to diminished responsibility, which I have already rejected.329 
This Article has expressed approval for an intermediate option 
between the extremes of murder liability and acquittal.  I have argued that 
imperfect self-defense is a more appropriate backup claim than provocation 
for battered women who killed their abusers because it explicitly 
acknowledges not only their fear, but also their honest belief in the 
necessity of using lethal force.  However, to shift partial defenses to murder 
away from excuses for unjustifiable valuations, we ought to demand a 
modicum of reasonableness and moral appropriateness in the defendant’s 
emotion or belief, even in cases of imperfect self-defense.  This is important 
because imperfect self-defense potentially applies to fact situations far 
removed from those of sympathetic battered women. 
For example, in Utah, a white supremacist prisoner fatally stabbed a 
fellow inmate, who was black, when the latter was in handcuffs and unable 
to protect himself.  The defendant-appellant, Troy Kell, claimed the trial 
court should have given a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter because he had overheard the victim making threats.330  
Whether this case should have gone to a jury is a close call.  Some Utah 
Supreme Court justices voted to affirm the denial of the lesser-included-
offense instruction; others wanted to hold that it was harmless error due to 
lack of corroborating evidence.331  Regardless, the case provides a 
compelling reminder that feminist criminal law reform affects not only 
broader concerns about the position of women in society, but also the moral 
 
328 State v. Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Wis. 1993) (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (going 
against an opinion holding that, in Wisconsin, imperfect self-defense requires a reasonable 
belief in the necessity of lethal force). 
329 See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.  
330 State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019, 1025, 1029 (Utah 2002). 
331 Id. at 1029 n.5. 
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coherence (or incoherence) of homicide law in cases unconnected to 
intimate-partner killings.  If we demand a minimum amount of rationality 
and moral judgment from Kell, as the Utah Supreme Court did, we should 
ask the same of women who killed their intimate partners. 
The partial defense I propose would be limited to homicides arising 
from self-protection or protection of others and would exclude completely 
delusional behavior.  Vera Bergelson has explained imperfect self-defense 
as a partial justification: 
If you try to kill me, you violate your duty to me, and thus lose moral parity with me.  
That loss of moral parity reduces your right to inviolability and allows me to disregard 
it to the extent necessary to protect my right to life.  That is a case of complete 
justification.  Overstepping these boundaries in cases of imperfect self-defense (either 
by exceeding the level of force reasonably necessary for the defense or by not 
following other requirements of a valid exercise of self-defense) . . . results only in 
partial justification of the perpetrator.332 
This understanding of imperfect self-defense reinforces the moral 
distinction between killing a person whom one perceives to pose a lethal 
threat and ending the life of someone who has caused only emotional 
wounds, frustration, or even no harm at all.  It also frees the doctrine from 
its associations with pathology and dysfunction, which restores the criminal 
law’s interests in assessing personal accountability. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The reform of homicide law only addresses the problem of intimate-
partner violence where other solutions have failed.  For this reason, it is a 
depressing enterprise.  As a society, we need to develop a social safety net 
so women can leave violent relationships and remain safe from 
retaliation.333  We should also emphasize anger management and other 
values of non-violence, so that there is less need for condemnatory 
convictions and long prison terms to reinforce the message that becoming 
enraged at one’s partner, or anyone else, generally provides no license to 
batter or kill, except in cases of justifiable, defensive acts.  Indeed, criminal 
law solutions may not offer the best approach to intimate-partner violence 
before it escalates to homicide.  That said, intimate-partner violence exists 
 
332 Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in 
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 472-73 (2005). 
333 Empirical evidence suggests a strong link between the increased availability of 
resources for battered women and a decline in intimate-partner homicides perpetrated by 
females.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN 
THE U.S., 1976-2005, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/intimates.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2010) (showing a 75% decline in the number of men killed by female intimates 
since 1976). 
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on a continuum from non-lethal bullying and relatively minor physical 
assaults to fatal shootings, stabbings, and other killings.334  The objection 
that the heavy hand of the criminal justice system creates problems at one 
end of this continuum335 does not refute the need to reform homicide law so 
that it makes appropriate judgments at the other end. 
Within the past few years, three Australian states—Tasmania, Victoria, 
and, most recently, Western Australia—took bold strides to transform 
defenses to murder to redress gender bias.  The common thread in their 
divergent approaches was the abolition of provocation as a mitigating 
doctrine in the guilt phase.  The reform effort on which this Article has 
focused—the comprehensive package adopted in Victoria—also sought to 
locate its restructuring in a bid for greater moral coherence in homicide law.  
Victoria’s reformers rejected the provocation doctrine both because it 
justifies unjustifiable acts of anger and dominance and because it excuses 
and stereotypes men as collectively prone to lethal rage.  The VLRC also 
made a frustratingly inconsistent attempt to emphasize relationship history 
and social-context evidence, in lieu of the BWS theory, and hence to depict 
battered women as rational moral actors engaged in justifiable responses to 
physical victimization. 
While the reforms in Victoria should inspire American lawmakers to 
overhaul their own system, such changes must be preceded by a more 
complete understanding of what ails murder defenses and how they have 
come to be even more indulgent of male violence and less connected to 
social norms than they were in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
In countries whose law derives from the English model, the history of 
exculpation and mitigation in murder cases has been one of a gradual 
default to psychological excuses.  Female defendants’ cases have long 
involved a strand of compassion for the supposed irrationality of the so-
called weaker sex; yet, in the nineteenth and even the early twentieth 
centuries, the law of provocation and self-defense was still tied to moral 
condemnation of violence against women.  As paternalistic solicitude for 
women faded and psychological interpretations of human behavior came 
into vogue, the criminal law’s emphasis on excusing irrationality became 
more pronounced.  The narrative of the wronged woman was almost 
completely eclipsed by the narrative of the female defendant as helpless, 
 
334 Much has been written about how these apparently diverse types of conduct are 
connected in patterns of coercive control.  For an early version of the “coercive control” 
thesis, see Stark, supra note 39, at 976. 
335 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 825-26 (2007) 
(suggesting that “feminists stop advocating for and supporting criminalization” of domestic 
violence because, in Gruber’s view, punitive prosecutorial approaches deny the agency of 
female victims and discriminate against racial minorities). 
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frenzied, and incapable of assessing her options, which is now embodied in 
diminished responsibility, insanity, and BWS-based self-defense claims.  
Similarly, the narrow doctrine of provocation has expanded dramatically to 
include myriad subjective traits of the accused, and in the United States, a 
substantial minority of jurisdictions have completely abandoned the 
traditional emphasis on killings triggered by wrongful victim behavior. 
Scholars began criticizing “abuse excuses” toward the end of the last 
century, but they often did so in anti-feminist ways, and most importantly, 
few recognized that the expansive, modern provocation and EMED 
doctrines were among the worst culprits.  This Article has reframed the 
critique of partial excuses for murder to acknowledge the gendered patterns 
of why men and women kill.  In undertaking this project, I have drawn 
heavily on the thoughtful and creative efforts of Australian reformers.  In 
the final analysis, however, I do not recommend that American states adopt 
a carbon copy of Victoria’s reforms.  First, both the proposed and adopted 
legislative changes in Victoria were inconsistent in their commitment to 
emphasizing equality-based principles of moral wrongfulness, as opposed 
to expanding psychologically based partial excuses.  Second, while this 
Article will be most successful if it prompts discussion of how murder 
defenses and penalties can be simultaneously reformed, the unsettled state 
of American sentencing law makes it advisable to draft a proposal that has 
the potential to succeed whether or not the recent countertrend toward 
greater sentencing discretion continues. 
This Article recommends three changes to partial defenses to murder 
in the United States that would anchor manslaughter mitigation to moral 
evaluation of the defendant’s reasons for killing: the repeal of statutes 
influenced by the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance 
defense, the curtailment of the provocation doctrine through legislative 
preclusions, and the widespread adoption of imperfect self-defense as a 
mitigating claim in cases where the defendant’s fear of physical 
victimization at the hands of the person she killed was more reasonable and 
justifiable than her homicidal act.  My recommendations would help ensure 
that the criminal law provides substantively equal treatment to women, as 
victims and defendants in murder cases, while reasserting their capacity for 
rational conduct and insisting that both sexes be held accountable for 
morally wrongful homicides. 
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APPENDIX 
INTIMATE-PARTNER MURDER CASES IN COLONIAL NEW SOUTH 
WALES, 1824-1840 
 
25 intimate murder cases sampled 
4 female defendants: 2 acquitted, 2 convicted of manslaughter  









Charge Verdict Sentence 
Bradney 1824 F M Petty treason 
murder*
Acquitted  




Bates 1825 M F Murder Guilty Executed
Bennett 1825 M F Murder Acquitted  
Chapman 1825 M F Murder Manslaughter 2 years 
Claig 1825 M F Murder Acquitted
Butler 1826 M F Murder Guilty Death  
Radley 1826 F M Petty treason 
murder
Manslaughter Unclear 
Hartland 1828 M F Murder Manslaughter 2 months
Miller 1828 M F Murder  Guilty  Death (commuted to 
transportation for life) 
Hughes 1829 M F Murder Manslaughter 6 months 
Venables 1829 M F Murder  Manslaughter Transportation for 7 
years
Byrne 1833 M F Murder Guilty Executed 
Dickenson 1833 M  F Murder Acquitted  
Farrel 1834 M F Murder Acquitted
McCormack 1834 M F Murder Guilty Executed 
Smith 1834 F M Murder Manslaughter Transportation for 7 
years
Bowles 1835 M F Murder Guilty Executed
James 1836 M F Murder Guilty Death (later freed) 
 
* Petty treason murder was “the murder of a husband by a wife, or a master by servant, or 
of a religious superior by one owing obedience.”  If a woman were convicted of this crime, 
the court would order her to be burned to death.  Petty treason was abolished in England by 
the Offences Against the Person Act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 31.  When New South Wales officially 
adopted English law in July 1828, the offense of petty treason was abolished there, too.  
G.D. WOODS, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES: THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 
1788-1900 121-22 (2002). 








Charge Verdict Sentence 
Crowley 1838 M F Murder Acquitted
Holden 1838 M F Murder Guilty Death (commuted to 
transportation for life) 
Long Jack 
(aboriginal) 
1838 M F Murder Guilty Death (may have been 
commuted) 
Finnie 1839 M F Murder Guilty Unclear 
McGee 1839 M F Murder Guilty Executed 
Glennie 1840 M F Murder Manslaughter Transportation for life 
 
